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ABSTRACTS

Editors: Dr Anastasios Theofilou, Dr Anastasia Veneti, Professor Tom Watson,
Dr Joyce Costello and Maria Musarskaya
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melike Aktaş, Senem Gençtürk Hızal, B. Pınar Özdemir</td>
<td>PR in Turkish Public Administration: 1960s to 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessa AlYasi</td>
<td>Government Public Relations in the United Arab Emirates: Historical Overview of Public Relations Practices of the Pre-Union Period (1960’s-1970’s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco Althaus</td>
<td>The Berlin Press Conference 1918–1933. The institutionalization of government PR and political journalism in the Weimar Republic’s daily news briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Anderson</td>
<td>Keeping Fit: How the U.S. Government Used Public Relations to Fight Venereal Disease after World War I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Anderson</td>
<td>“The next great plague to go”: How the U.S. Government Used Public Relations to Fight Venereal Disease during the Great Depression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liudmila Azarova, Vera Achkasova</td>
<td>The Russian model of government PR: peculiarities of institutionalizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tor Bang</td>
<td>From paternalism to partnership: fifty years of orchestration of anti-smoking communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Günter Bentele</td>
<td>THE &quot;INVENTION&quot; AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC RELATIONS IN GERMANY IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL PR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 19TH CENTURY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia A. Curtin</td>
<td>Organized Labor, Business, Government Regulation, and the U.S. Public Relations Profession: 1890 to 1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rendro Dhani, Terence Lee, Kate Fitch</td>
<td>The Evolution of Political Public Relations in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melissa D. Dodd</td>
<td>The Historical Development and Legitimization of Corporate Activism in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward J. Downes</td>
<td>The History of a Communication Management Revolution Led by Capitol Hill’s Press Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Garland</td>
<td>How did the UK government communications service resist and respond to the challenges of media transformation and the rise of ‘political spin’ after 1997?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Gregory</td>
<td>An analysis of Government Communication during David Cameron’s premiership. UK Government Communication 2010 to 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denise Hill</td>
<td>The United States Information Agency and US Racial Problems in the 1950s and 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teresa Holder</td>
<td>Eat this, don’t eat that: An analysis of social influence tactics in the American Sow the Seeds of Victory Campaign of World War I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syed Arabi Idid</td>
<td>The Emergence of Governmental Information Services in British Malaya: Exploring the Antecedent Growth to Malaysian Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel Kovacs</td>
<td>Public Relations, Emergency Relief, and the Military at St. Ottilien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel Kovacs</td>
<td>Public Relations and the FDA: Proactive Measures and Responding to Negative Product Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomoki Kunieda</td>
<td>Post-WW2 Transition of Tokyo’s Government PR: Democratization, Politicization and Optimization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brendan Maartens</td>
<td>‘The Irish Problem’: Recruiting to the British Armed Forces in Ireland Before and After the Easter Rising, 1914-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Schnee</td>
<td>About olive trees and broccoli: A history of political party emblems in the 20th and 21st century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrid Spatzier</td>
<td>From Communication to Real Policy - The Management Game of a Great Communicator. The Case Study of Bruno Kreisky, the Media Chancellor in Austria from 1970 to 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parichart Sthapitanonda, Sopark Panichpapiboon</td>
<td>History of Thai government PR: Lessons on power of social context in applying PR for peace process between Thailand and Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessalynn Strauss</td>
<td>“Good Trouble” in Sin City. A History of Protest and Social Activism in Las Vegas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dustin W. Supa, Caitlin Szczepanik</td>
<td>Bernays’ Last Stand: An investigation of the attempt to “professionalize” the public relations field in the United States through licensure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napawan Tantivejakul</td>
<td>Eight Decades of the Government Public Relations Department of Thailand: the Never Changing Story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gareth Thompson</td>
<td>The 1952 Memorandum on Government Publicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gareth Thompson</td>
<td>Promoting peace and global governance: The United Nations and The Blue Vanguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martina Topić</td>
<td>National Ideologies and Public Relations: An Analysis of the Work of Croatian People’s Movement in 19th Century Dalmatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Watson</td>
<td>The promotion of saintly cults in the medieval era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z. Yaakov Wise</td>
<td>How PR Created a Country: Mythos, Propaganda and the Balfour Declaration of 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald K. Wright, Sarab Kochhar</td>
<td>The Important and Significant Role Played by the Institute for Public Relations in the Growth and Development of Communication Research, Measurement and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heather Yaxley</td>
<td>Opening the box: A ‘pastpresents’ exploration of the archival fonds of a singular PR practitioner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

PR in Turkish Public Administration: 1960s to 1980s

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Public relations in Turkey has an exceptional status as it first appeared in the public administration unlike in many other countries where public relations has been a private sector activity. This study will firstly describe the conditions which made public relations possible in 1960s Turkish public administration institutions. Then it will scrutinize the first attempts of public relations campaigns of public administration during 1960-1980 period of institutionalization of public relations, the public institutions which enabled the institutionalization of public relations and first public relations units in various public institutions from a historical perspective. The study primarily draws on the in depth interviews which are conducted with the pioneers of public relations Alaeddin Asna, Altemur Kılıç and Birten Gökyay. It also benefits from government policy documents, related booklets published by various public institutions, institutional historiographies and chronologies, particular texts which frame re-constructing of the public administration and the public administration research.
Government Public Relations in the United Arab Emirates: Historical Overview of Public Relations Practices of the Pre-Union Period (1960’s-1970’s)

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Governments highly depend on public opinion for the success of their efforts in building nations and enhancing national identity. This is mainly through employing different public relation practices and strategies. In this case, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federal state which consists of seven Emirates: Dubai, AbuDhabi, Sharjah, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah and Umm Al Quwain. Driven by Pan-Arabism in region; followed by the end of the British mandate, The year 1971 marked the birth of UAE as an independent state led by the massive efforts the Father of Nation Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan and his fellows in the region. Literature reviews show that the history of the institutionalized Public Relations started after the federation period in the late 70’s and 80’s. However, historical records show evidence of different Public Relations activities and government communication during the pre-union period. This included mainly communication with Opinion Leaders and using publicity. For example, “Al Ittihad” newspaper (Arabic for the union) along with “Al Khaleej” (Arabic for the Gulf) were all established in the 1960’ with the aim to spread the vibes of cooperation, union, solidarity, and sense of belonging among the public. In addition the “Majlis” (Arabic for council) played important roles through interacting public with rulers and educated elites (Public Opinion Leaders) to discuss different concerned issues through direct physical gatherings. Based, on the four models of Public Relations, this study argues that reviewing historical records in the national archive, shows that in the pre-union period two models were used: the public information model and the two-way symmetric model.

References
ABSTRACT

The Berlin Press Conference 1918–1933. The institutionalization of government PR and political journalism in the Weimar Republic’s daily news briefing

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Background and Connection to the Present. In capitals around the world, governments host press briefings. Their PR managers typically control time, place, agenda, guests, access to the floor. They often prescreen and preselect questioners. Not so in Germany’s Federal Press Conference, or Bundespressekonferenz (BPK) where journalists organize and chair the government’s main routine encounters with correspondents. Its sister bodies in 16 German state capitals do the same. This is a unique legacy of the Weimar Republic, pioneered in 1918.

For today’s foreign observer fresh in Berlin, the current routine must be puzzling. Thrice weekly at fixed times, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s spokesman (chief of the Federal Press and Information Office at the rank of state secretary) and spokespersons of all 14 ministries march to the correspondents’ association’s own conference building near the Reichstag. They are guests of the press corps. The chair, who holds full domiciliary rights, is always a journalist from the peers-elected BPK management board. The door and floor are formally open to all 900 dues-paying members – from eminent mainstream media veterans to quirky video bloggers. 400 Foreign Press Club colleagues also enjoy access and questioning privileges – again, a unique feature in Berlin compared to international practice.

Questioning of the government continues as long as the chair allows. Government guests face reporters’ questions they can neither select, cut off, nor ignore. They may rhetorically evade questions, but attend and answer they must. No law requires them to; only tradition does. At regular intervals and on big news days, the chancellor, cabinet ministers, parliament and party leaders, or foreign state premiers will sit here for friendly banter or hard grilling.

While consensus has it that, compared to political life in the former capital of Bonn, this venue has lost much relevance for news hunters and PR due to harsh competition, the BPK is stubbornly alive and has its entrenched defenders. On good days, its unscripted exchanges make breaking news without the government’s intent. It is still a symbol of a free press.

Today’s organization was born in 1949 in Bonn; it is as old as Germany’s constitution. But its founding was an act of revival. With some modifications, it restored the journalist-run Berlin Press Conference of 1918–1933. It was the key daily event for political news in the Weimar era. Its self-organized setup was entirely unheard of in any foreign capital. It shaped press expectations toward government PR. It led to fast growth of press staff in the republic’s government apparatus, and put German state PR on a track apart from other nations.

The paper explores the Press Conference’s origins and institutionalization. Based on participant accounts, the paper traces the origins to a response to World War I censorship and news control, investigates its rise to prominence as Weimar’s “second parliament,” and analyzes issues of organization, routines, criticism of its status and newsworthiness, and
standards of conduct. It then briefly tracks the path of the institution’s Gleichschaltung in 1933 by Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels who turned it into a totalitarian tool, and its quick post-war resurrection by Weimar press and PR veterans in the British Occupation Zone (1947) and British-American Bizone (1948) until today’s BPK was organized in 1949.

**Methodology and Sources.** Guided by an interpretative framework of institutionalization theory, the paper’s thrust is a “thick description” to back up thematic analysis. It builds on a mosaic of primary sources to overcome the lack of archived material lost in World War II.

A key barrier is that news reports did not yet attribute quotes to the Conference. Members met behind closed doors, proceeded orally, and had no paid secretariat or systematic archive. Only a single photograph is known. The state kept its own records, but they were destroyed when Goebbels’ ministry took a hit by a U.S. air mine in March 1945. Key sources for the paper are published memoirs from journalists (Bernhard, Dombrowski, Feder, Kern, Krämer, Lachmann, Lewinsohn, Lückenhau, Oehme, Range, Schwedler, Silex, Stein, von Eckardt, Wolter, Zimmermann), spokespersons (Brammer, Heide, Müller, Spiecker, Stephan, Zechlin), and a few politicians. The author also discovered an exiled journalist’s (May) unpublished memoir in the Leo Baeck Institute archive in New York. Memoirs may, of course, include contradictory or falsely remembered information, anecdotes and musings rather than good descriptions or analyses. The author verified and cross-checked as far as possible. Other sources include 1920-30s academic and professional journals (Deutsche Presse, Zeitungs-Verlag, Zeitungswissenschaft); and Reich Chancellery cabinet files in the Federal Archive.

**Findings.** The Conference was an institutional innovation. In an instable state just created by the 1918 revolution, it was a vital creative solution for bringing together a newly confident, freer press and enterprising new PR personnel. Its value lay in being a bridge and buffer zone, a transition and transaction area. This gave it an ambivalent character. Yet the Conference was not a half-baked institution. It quickly became a fully-fledged part of the polity, meeting several thousand times over 14 years. It put press and PR in a conflict-rich but productive community, synchronized them in a working rhythm and feedback loop, and built a mutual understanding of newsworthiness and public accountability. It always had its critics. But on better days, it was a vibrant place of discourse engaging brilliant journalists and statesmen.

At the start, it was a precarious enterprise. Amid near-civil war and coup d’etat attempts, early Weimar cabinets grew restless with the unruly press and its autonomy. Some conspired to block and discard the Conference – but they never dared to. Winning the acceptance of governing elites and holding it for 14 years was a substantial feat. It was a result of professional learning and socialization. The Conference won acceptance because it worked for both sides and proved compatible with emerging political practice in the Weimar era.

The Conference was not a mere press club. Correspondents built a forum which received state recognition and constant participation. This is partly explainable because emergent PR people wanted it so. It marked a professional spot for a growing PR apparatus which searched for a role and place. It adapted to the new routines and rituals. Spokesmen who knew how to
play the Conference game well rose to be non-expendable actors on the national scene. Thus, the Conference helped mold modern German government PR and elevated its political status.

The institution was full of contradictions. The paper shows its ambivalence. Despite its public mission, it grew as a half-shade plant behind always-closed doors. It unequivocally granted equal access for mainstream scribes but excluded some media (foreign and radical papers, radio newsmen, photographers, and film reporters). Its confidentiality rules often hid political maneuvers instead of highlighting them. The Conference was subject to raison d’etat, pressure to protect “national interests,” ministerial rivalries, and accelerated news media competition. It formed a line of interaction between press and government, but often exposed a second front between government and opposition forces among the highly partisan press.

The Conference was a main gate for information flows but no monopoly; it was an add-on. Its journalistic value lay in personal contacts and atmospheric impressions. For PR men, relaying facts was less important than winning sympathy for unpopular policies and spinning opinion. Collectively, the Conference decreased manipulation risks; but its chumminess and conformity increased them. It lived well by collegial yet robust fair play under neutral chairs, and codified rules for on- and off-the-record remarks; yet despite the formally hard rules, “soft” enforcement worked better than the few case of official sanctions. As the republic neared its end, trust and civility decreased. The Conference began to erode from within long before Hitler’s men took over the easy prey.

**Originality.** This paper is the first English-language account of the 1918-33 Berlin Press Conference, building on a recent comprehensive German-language study by the same author. While German government press conferences of both World War I and the Nazi era have been studied well, the Weimar Republic’s institution, sandwiched between the two periods, has been scarcely explored despite its critical role model function for post-1945 Germany. The paper fills the void and helps to understand the roots of today’s ongoing practice.
ABSTRACT

Keeping Fit: How the U.S. Government Used Public Relations to Fight Venereal Disease after World War I

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Purpose of study

This study shows how the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) promoted its sex education programs in the post-World War I years and examines what these efforts could mean to contemporary efforts on the same subject. Specifically, this study reviews three USPHS campaigns: “Keeping Fit: An Exhibit for Young Men and Boys” released in 1918, and “Youth and Life: An Exhibit for Girls and Young Women” and “Keeping Fit: For Negro Boys and Young Men” released in 1922. This case study approach helps improve understanding of how a government agency used PR to influence - and was influenced by - social issues in postwar America.

Background

Over the course of World War I, hospitals admitted an estimated 100,000 more American soldiers for venereal diseases (VD) than for the total number of combat casualties (Ireland, 1928, p. 271). VD became so terrifying to Americans that it was called the “red plague,” in reference to the red lights that marked brothels in vice districts. During the war, the government had created an anti-vice campaign that associated VD with a loss of military efficiency. This effort lifted the Victorian conspiracy of silence about sex, but the wartime VD campaign had been an anomaly. As America returned to normalcy after the war, silence regarding sex, and VD, returned.

This does not mean that the fight against VD had ended. The government still funded an anti-VD program, but, with limited monies and with VD no longer seen as an enemy of the war effort, public health officials had to navigate the political and social complexities of discussing a taboo subject (sex) with adolescents in a delicate and cost-effective way. The resulting health education was focused more on social values such as self-control than medical approaches to preventing or combatting VD.

Method

Various USPHS communications materials and official reports from the archives of the Social Welfare Archives at the University of Minnesota Libraries underwent textual analysis for objectives, messages, and outcomes.

Findings

Each of the three USPHS campaigns was part of the postwar effort to redesign sex-
education programs for white soldiers into programs for civilians. During the war, government-sponsored sex-education campaigns catered primarily to white males. After the war, public health officials acknowledged that maintaining a general state of public health would require that they provide diverse populations with information about sex. Rather than create one general civilian campaign, these officials targeted their messages to white males, white females, and African American males. While the campaigns were a step forward in that they worked to alleviate disparities in health care, they also reinforced some common assumptions about traditional gender roles and racial hierarchies. The campaigns also seemed to completely ignore African American females.

Each campaign used similar materials – posters, slides, and pamphlets – to communicate a singular message: maintaining one’s health, including sexual health, required self-control. The obvious difference among the campaigns was that the cultural appeals, images, and copy were adjusted to resonate with each audience.

In terms of outcomes, the campaign had prolific output in the first two years of the inaugural Keeping Fit campaign with more than 22 million pamphlets being distributed (USPHS, 1920). This output generated a significant impact on the audience. When high school boys were asked if the Keeping Fit pamphlet changed their opinions in any way, 41% said it had changed their opinion about seminal emissions; 39% about said it had changed their opinion about masturbation; 22% said it had changed their opinion about continence; and 30% said it had changed their opinion about VD (Achilles, 1923, p. 93). In addition to quantifiable metrics, the program achieved anecdotal praise as well. One teacher said, “I am glad that the Government has taken [sex education] up.” A father said that the program “was worth $500 to my boy” (USPHS, 1920, p. 12).

Implications

Although each USPHS campaign contained distinct images and copy, all three provided their audiences – including previously underrepresented health populations such as women and African American males – with comparable information about sexual health. How USPHS officials publicized these campaigns helped separate them from each other, which served to mask the resemblances in the information about sex, and the focus on social values instead of preventative measures such as prophylaxis protected the campaigns from criticism.

This study shows how three U.S. public sex education campaigns in the 1920s used inclusive and comprehensible messages. Examining how these past sex education campaigns were implemented and promoted can help in the development and promotion of a modern-day sex-education platform.

References


USPHS. (1920). *Two years fighting VD: A report of the first two year’s work in the program of combatting venereal*
ABSTRACT

“The next great plague to go”: How the U.S. Government Used Public Relations to Fight Venereal Disease during the Great Depression

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Purpose of this study
This study shows how a U.S. governmental agency in the 1930s used persuasive communication to pierce the veil of silence around venereal disease (VD) to craft a national vision for social hygiene.

Background
In the early 1930s, approximately one out of ten Americans suffered from syphilis. Each year, Americans contracted almost half a million new infections – twice as many cases as tuberculosis and a hundred times the number of cases of the dreaded infantile paralysis (“How prevalent is …,” 1932). Another venereal disease (VD), gonorrhea, had close to 700,000 new infections annually (Parran, 1936, p. 65).

In November 1934, CBS scheduled a radio address on its “Doctors, Dollars, and Disease” program by New York State Health Commissioner Thomas Parran Jr. on the goals of his office. Parran planned to review the major problems confronting public health officers in their battle against disease, including VD. CBS told him he could not mention syphilis or gonorrhea by name, so Parran refused to go on the air. The controversy launched a national conversation on VD, as well as Parran’s career with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointing him as U.S. surgeon general in 1936.

Method
Data for Parran’s anti-VD campaign in the late 1930s was obtained from the online Social Welfare Archives at the University of Minnesota Libraries and from the Thomas Parran Papers collection at the University of Pittsburgh. A textual analysis on the communications materials and correspondence was used to identify objectives, messages, and desired outcomes.

Findings
Soon after he became surgeon general, Parran went on the offensive against VD. Parran outlined his VD control program in an article titled, “The next great plague to go,” which appeared in Survey Graphic and Reader’s Digest.

Parran rejected former anti-VD campaigns’ emphasis on morality. Instead, Parran implemented a campaign that illustrated the social and economic costs of VD and stressed the advantages of fighting it. Children born with syphilis, fractured families, and those penniless
because of medical bills all became the symbols of ignoring VD. On the other hand, cheerful workers and families were shown as the results of participation in the anti-VD campaign. Parran wanted his audiences to know that if they followed the advice of his campaign they would lead happy, healthy and productive lives.

He also positioned the government as a key cog in the care of venereal sufferers. Campaign materials argued that the impact of VD affected the entire community, not just those with the disease; therefore, more government involvement and tax dollars were needed to address this issue. During the Great Depression, Americans were worried about the nation’s recovery and anything that could adversely affect that economic recuperation – such as a sick worker who hurt industrial efficiency – resonated with them. A venereal sufferer not only failed to earn money for his family, but also became another person on the already bloated relief rolls. In the struggle for recovery, Parran argued that the elimination of VD would help strengthen families, communities, businesses, and the nation, and America could only win this fight with cooperation between the government and citizens.

Parran’s campaign helped change attitudes about the role of the state in developing a more robust public health program. Gallup Polls in the 1930s revealed that large majorities of Americans supported massive appropriations to make public health programs possible. In 1938, Congress unanimously passed the National Venereal Disease Control Act, appropriating up to $3 million for anti-VD public health measures for the fiscal year 1939. $5,000,000 for 1940. $7,000,000 for 1941, no small feat during the Great Depression.

Implications

St. John, Lamme, and E’tang, J. (2014) said, “An issues-based approach holds more promise of unraveling how PR … could be used to address contemporary communication challenges” (p. 203). In the 1930s, Parran’s campaign distanced VD from immorality, illicit sex, marginalized groups, and framed it as an infectious disease like any other that affected all types of people. In doing so, he removed the “venereal” from venereal disease, to gain public, governmental, and financial support for what had previously been a taboo subject. Understanding how Parran addressed the VD issue in his time can help inform current PR practices related to similar concerns.

References


ABSTRACT

The Russian model of government PR: peculiarities of institutionalizing

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The purpose of this paper is the study of the evolution and state of government public relations in Russia, the history of which, unlike their Western counterparts, is slightly more than a quarter of a century. In this research the authors undertake one of the first attempts to indicate the steps of this phenomenon institutionalization process, and also highlight the essential characteristics which are inherent to each of the steps.

The methodological foundation of the analysis are the basic ideas about the role of government PR as a part of the democratization process (Geldersc & cIhlen, 2010, p. 61), allowing in modern conditions for the state structures to be sufficiently flexible and interactive to establish contacts with different target audiences. As compared to the private sector where the management efficiency is measured by profit or the lack of it, in public administration it is measured by people's support or the lack of it (Milakovich & Gordon, 2009, p. 10). Hence the strength of state power is largely determined by its ability to keep the balance of social forces, the ability to operate in a mode of an open system. It is this fact that helps citizens to feel that they are more involved in the political process. For countries such as Russia, which are in the stage of social transformation and have a multiethnic structure, particularly important seems the idea that the activities of government public relations, which respect the diversity of opinions, can result in the strengthening of national unity (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 60-61; White, L'Etang& Moss, 2009, p. 396). It is the national consolidation that allows to show other countries the exemplary model of the most effective work of government PR.

The process of institutionalization of these offices in Russia differs substantially from the evolution of PR structures in the bodies of state power abroad, especially in countries with established democracies.

Comparative analysis of this process makes it possible to distinguish several criteria: the duration of historical development, way of functioning, and trends that define the evolution of government PR at the present time.

In Russia, public relations in state and municipal administration began to develop intensively only at the turn of 1980-90-ies, which were marked by the beginning of political and economic transformation. The peculiarity of the resulting PR model was determined by the basic principles of relations between power and society with the help of the press laid in the last stage of the USSR existence. The most active structures for the implementation of PR
projects and information campaigns, then, was the Press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the state news Agency TASS and APN, the state television and radio. The main functions of press-centers and press-services were the organization of information and publishing activities of the authorities, information support of the state mass media, accreditation of journalists and work with citizens. In the initial period of public relations development in the government sphere the primary task most often was creating a personal brand of the first persons of the state. As has been noted by researchers this period was characterized by the inconsistency and the elements of the combination of propaganda and PR in the information activities of the government bodies typical for the transition period (Chumikov, Bocharov, 2013).

The second stage of development of the government PR in Russia covers the period of the first half of the 1990s - late 2000s. It is the period of the final institutionalization of the government PR-structures: clear boundaries of their activities have been formed, the staff has been supplemented by professionals, a range of functional responsibilities has been developed. The main functions of their activities have been transformed: work with mass media has ceased to be a priority; analytical and research function, encompassing serious attention to the interests and requirements of society became the primary task; logically the second in importance was the development of strategic and tactical plans for information and communication impact on public opinion.

The third stage, the current state of government public relations in Russia, which began in the first half of the 2010s, is determined by several processes. We are talking primarily about the process of integration of communications, which leads to the combination of all components of the communication process – PR, advertising, marketing. As a result, in the public administration several autonomous services, engaged in information and communication activities united into one. This is particularly noticeable at the level of regional government bodies. The main emphasis in the activities of these structures is again made to the communication with the media, and to work with citizens. In fact, we can notice the turn to the initial stage of government PR. It is obvious that in a rapidly changing reality, such approach to communication is not justified. In addition, dramatic processes in the international arena (the use of harsh methods in the solution of interstate conflicts, the intensification of uncompromising discursive methods of media practices when discussing important issues, etc.), make the authorities to resort to the propaganda methods of influence. Therefore we can observe the narrowing of the range of PR tools use.

Findings. Analysis of the specificity of the existing models of public PR as a result will allow to identify the emerging main trends of its further evolution, obstacles and challenges that arise in this process that will be very useful for other States going on the path of transition.

Limitations of this study are in the tendency of government structures to work in the mode of a closed system in terms of the provision of information about the work of internal structures, including PR services. The way out is seen in the application of more sophisticated qualitative research methods.
References


ABSTRACT

From paternalism to partnership: fifty years of orchestration of anti-smoking communication

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Background:
Throughout the post-war era, it has been an established fact that tobacco smoking is harmful to smokers and smokers’ surroundings. Since the 1950s, public health authorities have campaigned to the public, with two main objectives: 1) not to start smoking, or 2) quit smoking.

Smoking history in post-war Norway.
After the wartime shortage of tobacco products, such were among the first to skip the postwar restrictions of rationing. Eggs and dairy products were rationed until 1949, imported meats, coffee and sugar until 1952, and cars until 1960.

There are sales records prior to 1971, when the government agency Statistics Norway, and Statens Tobakkskaderåd, a branch of the Public Health Agency, started to develop statistics on smoking habits. The 1973 statistics suggest that 51% of the male, and 32% of the female population, aged 16-74, were daily smokers, as well as another 12%, who were on and off smokers. In 1999, the numbers were 32% for both genders. Figures for 2016 show that 13% of the male and 11% of the female population are smokers; among the youngest stratum, 16-24, around 3% smoke. Breaking down the numbers, demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds are important determinants. Among the urban young adults in metropolitan Oslo, usually social innovators, there are hardly any smokers among the ethnic majority population, while the number of smokers are still in double digits among African and Latin immigrants, as well as among ethnic Norwegians and Sami in arctic regions, as well as in national strata with little secondary education.

Research question:
This paper seeks to shed light on the anti-smoking communication and campaigning methodologies in Norway between the mid-1960s until today’s date.

Literature:
Campaign literature is partly general, partly applied, reflecting its surroundings. In his introductory chapter "Campaigns for Social «Improvement»", Salmon (1989) discusses the claim that the promotion of ideas in principle and methodologically differs little from marketing of commercial products. Researchers tried to answer the key question empirically: is there a universal key to changing attitudes and social behaviour, in line with consumer behaviour? In longitude studies that may extend over several decades, it is impossible to
isolate the impact of communication efforts, and identify them as crucial variables. This has led to discussions about the need to define goals and objectives a priori, before measuring success or failure seen on the backgrounds of marketing literature.

In Rice & Atkin (eds., 2013) Snyder & LaCroix discuss effects of health campaigning in mass media channels, especially «conditions under which they [campaigns] have a greater likelihood of changing health behaviors» (p. 113). Their meta-analyses were designed as experiments, in which control groups were exposed to other methods of health interventions, i.e. face-to-face counseling in small groups, or individually. Of the 32 campaigns in their sampling, the 12 on smoking were the least successful, across the board of types of interventions, like inter-personal counseling, phone calls, mass media campaigns and some tailored digital approaches. Snyder & LaCroix argue that carefully designed mass media campaigns can be effective if they reach defined target groups, i.e. urban gay populations and safe-sex campaigns, or suburban commuters and seat belts. They quote Felley & Moon (2006), who argue that campaigns targeted to ethnic minorities or demographics with low socioeconomic statuses are often at least as effective as campaigns designed for the general population.

In his dissertation, (2002) Haug found four states of anti-smoking campaigns in Norway: 1) a 1950s campaign designed on a presumption that smokers lacked information on effects of smoking and therefore adequate knowledge would stop smoking given scientific data on health effects. 2) 1990s campaigns emphasized self-help efforts, such as nicotine replacement. 3) efforts to prevent young people from starting to smoke were targeted to high-risk groups in certain socioeconomic and social environments, also in the 1990s. 4) a late 1990s, early 2000s campaign was an orchestration of a number of individual and environmental strategies; a “broad community intervention that tried to use all available channels to influence the individual, its environment and society in a coordinated fight against smoking” (2002, p 44, 45).

In her master thesis (2016) Aambo interviewed former smokers who had quit smoking after downloading a mobile application, “Slutta”, (I have) quit. In qualitative interviews, she found that the broad, dialogic range of communication tactics in the app, were perceived as motivating and encouraging, and that, as one respondent told her “quitting (smoking) is something between me and my mobile phone. I want no other help” (2016, p. 3).

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ABSTRACT

THE "INVENTION" AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC RELATIONS IN GERMANY IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL PR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 19TH CENTURY

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The purpose of this paper is the historical reconstruction, description of the beginning and institutionalization of "modern public relations" in Germany (Prussia) at the beginning of the 19th century. The beginnings are taking place in the context of governmental public relations of the prussian government. Methods are the analysis and evaluation of historical literature and the writings of Karl Varnhagen von Ense, but also archive research and document analysis.

The development of a new social practice, which should have important implications for organizations as well as the society as a whole, can be seen with the beginning of the nineteenth century, since all criteria for the existence of "modern public relations" are fulfilled at this time. Modern public relations can be defined a) through organized and full-time PR activities of an organization (e.g. as a department in a larger organization), b) management of information and communication processes between the organization and the (internal and external) publics or stakeholder groups. The existence of a developed media system in society is c) a precondition as well as the (d) existence of a structured public sphere. Under these conditions, e) a professional field of public relations could develop in a strict sense. Karl August Varnhagen of Ense, who communicated on behalf of the Prussian government, especially on behalf of Karl August von Hardenberg, the Prussian Chancellor during the Congress of Vienna and some years after, was an outstanding figure in this process and will be placed at the center of the process. The biographical-historical research has either completely overlooked this aspect (cf. Pickett, 1985) or paid too little attention to it (Misch 1925, Feilchenfeldt 1970, Wiedenmann 1994). Only older research (Kindt 1927) and writings of the historian Werner Greiling (1997) have dealt with this aspect in more detail.

On the basis of some historical background (Prussian liberation wars against the occupation of Napoleon) some autobiographical and other writings of Varnhagen, the concrete professional activities (instruments, strategic papers, etc.) of this outstanding person are described. Karl August Varnhagen was born on February 21, 1785, the son of a doctor who himself was a child of a "garrison medicus". Varnhagen learned much very early of the atmosphere of the French Revolution by having accompanied his father to Strasbourg as a little boy. He studied medicine but also came into contact with well-known philosophers and writers early on. In 1804 he began his literary career by working together with Adalbert von Chamisso at the Berlin “Musenalmanach”. In 1809 he joined the Austrian army, was wounded in the battle of Deutsch-Wagram in the same year, before he met Napoleon during a four months' stay in Paris and also met Friedrich Karl von Tettenborn, who worked in
Russian services. 1813 he was editor of the "newspaper from the field camp" in Tettenborn's staff and worked on the "History of the War of Colonel Tettenborn" (1814). In 1814 he married Rahel Levin, who was the initiator and organizer of a well known “Literary Salon” in Berlin. From October 1814 to June 1815 he participated as "Spiritus Rector" in the Vienna Congress amid of a group of literati in the place of a "legation secretary" under von Hardenberg. Varnhagen had exclusively Public Relations functions. 1815 he stayed in Paris as a kind of “chief of the press” of Hardenberg. In 1819 he descended as ministerial minister after competence conflicts and "liberal machinations". In 1820 he approached again to Hardenberg, taking again official orders in communication. In 1833, Rachel, who was 14 years older than him, died. In 1848 he was witness of the revolution of 1848 in Berlin. Varnhagen died on October, 10, 1858.

After Varnhagen had already written antinapoleonic articles for General Tettenborn in 1813, in which he addressed the French military in a harsh and critical manner, he worked some time for the newspaper "Deutscher Beobachter", and wrote about political topics from a pro-Russian perspective. Probably not least because of these experiences, he was entrusted by Prussian Chancellor Hardenberg in 1814 with "a number of journalistic tasks and received the humble status of a legation secretary" (Greiling, 1993, 39). Varnhagen, who was to be called to the rather vague promise of Hardenberg to be a "future Prussian state servant" (Misch 1925, 33) went to the Vienna Congress in October 2015 to work for the Prussian state Chancellor, Karl August Freiherr von Hardenberg as a "Spokesperson", probably the first spokesman in Germany.

Which concrete activities of Varnhagen and his literary colleagues in Vienna and Paris can be reconstructed? Varnhagen had 1) to observe constantly the public discussion, 2) regularly produced and annotated reports about the press, which he had to present to Hardenberg. He wrote 3) political articles to bring political positions of Prussia into the public discussion and thereby had the chance to influence the public opinion. Some of the articles were sent under deck addresses (Fournier, 1913, 390). In addition, he had 4) the task of coordinating literate persons during the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15. Maintaining 5) personal contacts with politicians, political journalists and publishers (Kontaktpflege) was an important concern. The analysis of key political issues (6) and, on this basis, 7) the development of strategies for state press policy and public relations through the creation of "memoranda", that is, short strategy papers, were further activities. And, of course, 8) the contact management with talented authors and dialogue-minded literati, which could be won again for the Prussian state service, was an important concern.

In the presentation, these first activities of organized public relations are set in a time-historical context and the emergence of an early professional field of literary and "official" publicists, in other words, of early spokespersons and communication managers, is presented. This is new knowledge, because nobody has written about Varnhagen as an “inventor” of Public Relations so far.
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ABSTRACT
Organized Labor, Business, Government Regulation, and the U.S. Public Relations Profession: 1890 to 1930

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PR historians have suggested that professionalized U.S. PR practice grew in tandem with business leaders’ realization during the Progressive Era that favorable public opinion was becoming a necessary license to operate (e.g., Raucher, 1968; Tedlow, 1979), but little work has examined this development in terms of larger contemporary social, cultural, and economic issues, particularly as concerns labor. This study explores the development of PR as a profession in the only advanced capitalist country in the late 19th and early 20th century that did not have a Labor Party (by any name) and had the fewest protections for labor and the most government- and private-sponsored violence used against labor (Archer, 2007). It examines how businesses worked with the growing PR profession to garner public support to prevent further government regulation of business following the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act and allow capitalism to proceed unfettered until 1930 (the Great Depression), as well as how organized labor used its own PR practices to create counter-narratives of the American way.

Scholars often examine this time period because it marks the beginning of U.S. PR as a recognized profession (Raucher, 1968), possibly in part because it was also a time of social and economic upheaval. Industrialization and business consolidation saw the advent of the assembly line (1913) and passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Business membership organizations and trade associations launched, including the conservative Nation Association of Manufacturers, the Rotary Club, and the moderate National Civic Federation, which included business, labor, and PR leaders. The growth of a managerial middle class distinct from rank and file workers exacerbated class differences in a country proud of its lack of class distinctions (Tone, 1997). Three boom and bust cycles marked the period: financial depressions in 1893 and 1907 culminated in the Great Depression of 1930. The federal government launched commissions to investigate labor in the 1900s, and the role of government in labor relations was hotly contested, with both employers and employees using PR to vie for favorable public opinion (Holden, 2002).

During the boom times, immigrants swelled workforce numbers, and the U.S. population almost doubled from 1890 (~63 million) to 1930 (~123 million). As the more ‘desirable’ Northern and Western Europeans (often Protestant) gave way to the ‘less desirable’ Eastern and Southern Europeans (often Catholic) and Asians, the government instituted the 1902 Immigration Act and the 1921 Emergency Quota Act to stem the tide (Archer, 2007). Some companies, such as NCR, refused to hire any but native born and used PR tactics to obtain media coverage to showcase their promotion of U.S. enterprise (Tone, 1997). Other companies used house organs, often part of their corporate welfare programs, to
assimilate immigrants. For example, one taught immigrant women how to comb their hair and cook—skills that apparently could only be learned in the U.S—to demonstrate concern for workers (Tone, 1997). Businesses used PR efforts to equate capitalist enterprise with a Protestant work ethic, and Protestant clergy were often vehemently, and publicly, anti-union (Archer, 2007). The fact that Ivy Lee was a Methodist minister’s son appears to have played at least some part in business leaders’ acceptance of him and the PR function (Tedlow, 1979).

Previous PR histories have touched on labor violence in terms of the Ludlow Massacre and Lee’s involvement, but these accounts have tended to be written with an eye toward professionalizing PR as a mainstay of democracy. Often unmentioned is that “The United States during the early twentieth century was the only advanced individual country where corporations wielded coercive military power” (Norwood, 2002, p. 3). Ludlow was but one of many violent episodes during this time in which corporations employed strike-breaking forces against workers. In 1892 Congress gave business the right to use force to protect private property, and by 1893 more than 20 union-busting security firms existed in Chicago alone. In just one three-year period, 198 people were killed and 1,966 injured in labor disputes (Domhoff, 2013). President Taft, in 1911, established the Commission on Industrial Relations to investigate violence against workers, prompting business to use PR as a means of promoting public support and lobbying Congress; by 1920 any federal legislation to better workers’ rights had been effectively limited in amount and scope (Tone 1997).

The Red Scare of 1919 coincided with strikes by 4+ million workers, providing some business groups the ammunition they needed to promote themselves as the bastions of American values, as embodied by capitalism, and paint labor unions as socialist or, worse yet, communist. In fact, few unions were aggressively socialist, with the exception of the Workers of the World, or Wobblies. Formed in 1905 in the Western U.S. in response to conditions at mining camps, the Wobblies were routinely persecuted, and these actions were tacitly and sometimes explicitly supported by the U.S. government (Brody, 1993). PR efforts by business organizations such as NAM helped the socialist/communist label stick to all union members, contributing to organized labor’s decline in the 1920s (Domhoff. 2013).

In turn, labor union activists at times led the way in developing public relations strategies and tactics. During the 1902 coal strikes, for example, union leaders proved adept at media relations and garnered much more sympathetic media coverage than did company practitioners (Tedlow, 1979). Activist, and immigrant, Mother Jones was perhaps the most successful union publicist at this time, using age and gender as strategic weapons rather than weaknesses and speeches and mass marches as tactics to successfully garner media attention. A commonly used union tactic, later adopted by labor sympathizer Franklin Delano Roosevelt for government efforts, was song. The maudlin “Daddy was killed by the Pinkerton Men,” the Wobblies Little Red Song Book, and countless other songs provided calls to action that didn’t depend on a literate public, working to provide solidarity among numerous ethnicities and create positive public opinion and sympathy for union members.

Throughout this time period, PR professionals and union activists operated within larger structural constraints—class, ethnicity, gender, religion, capital, political—that shaped
the development of the field. This study uses numerous primary sources (e.g., media coverage; contemporary textbooks; personal papers/archives from business, PR, and union leaders; union and business newsletters; and government documents), supplemented by secondary sources from a range of disciplines, to illustrate how labor, government, and business interacted within the larger cultural and socio-economic milieu of Progressive-era America to shape the development of U.S. PR as a profession.

References


ABSTRACT

The Evolution of Political Public Relations in Indonesia

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Research into the development of public relations in Indonesia has been sparse, with only a small number of studies to date (see, for example, Ananto, 2004; Simorangkir, 2011, 2013; Yudarwati, 2010, 2014). In particular, there is almost no research specifically in the sub-disciplinary area of political public relations (Willnat & Aw, 2009; Yudarwati, 2014). This study aims to fill this gap by investigating the professionalisation of political public relations in Indonesia, focusing on President Yudhoyono’s administration (2004–2014). It draws on in-depth interviews with senior public relations practitioners, presidential spokespersons, political experts, political consultants, news media editors, and senior journalists in the presidential palace associated with the Yudhoyono era. The interviews were conducted in Jakarta, between December 2015 and February 2016.

The modern practice of political public relations in Indonesia began in the early 2000s and coincided with the first direct presidential and legislative general elections in 2004 (Author, 2016). President Wahid dissolved Deparhemen Penerangan (Deppen, the Ministry of Information) in 1999 and the tasks of public communication, including explaining government policies, moved partly to the president’s office. Deppen had become a propaganda tool of Sukarno’s anti-colonialism and anti-liberalism ideology (Author, 2004). In the Soeharto era (1966–1998), Deppen promoted Soeharto’s anti-communist ideology, as well as maintained and controlled two government electronic media outlets, namely TVRI and RRI (Author, 2004). Following the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, Indonesia witnessed enormous changes in many sectors, including in the public relations industry. The rapid growth of public relations firms, political consultants, and political polling surveys were just few of the developments. In the post-Soeharto Reformation era, the news media enjoyed a high degree of press freedom. The euphoria of democracy persisted at all levels of society and led to a new culture where street protests were the preferred method of carrying out democratic rights, while other mechanisms for citizens to express their concerns were relatively less developed. Presidents Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati arguably failed to adapt
to these changes and, therefore, only managed to rule Indonesia for a total of six years (1998–2004) between them.

The early findings in this study reveal that President Yudhoyono made significant changes in the president’s communication office, both in the organisational structure and communication and information systems. During his presidency (2004–2014), Yudhoyono was assisted by several military officers who become his confidants. However, he also employed public relations professionals to deal with news management and agenda building, issues management and crisis management. The advance of political public relations in the Yudhoyono administration marks an important step in the professionalisation of presidential communication. Even though the Yudhoyono presidency was frequently criticised by civil society and opposition parties, his government’s persistence in exercising public relations strategies arguably enabled political longevity far more than his immediate predecessors. The findings allow a stronger understanding of the role of political public relations in maintaining both legitimacy and political stability and its links with propaganda. The key question here is whether political public relations in Indonesia can be understood as encouraging and enabling liberal democracy or otherwise.

References


ABSTRACT

The Historical Development and Legitimization of Corporate Activism in the U.S.

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Corporate engagement in controversial social-political issues has the potential to influence public attitudes and behaviors surrounding the most important issues of today. The evolution of corporate activism is preceded by histories that shaped American society and democracy into a place that legitimizes corporate engagement in controversial social-political issues. Couched in theories of issues management and corporate social responsibility, this article takes a historical approach to corporate activism, identifying key developments that gave way to modern corporate participation in controversial issues.

On the evening of June 17, 2015, a 21-year-old white male entered Emanuel African Episcopal Church, one of the nation’s oldest black churches and a historic civil rights site located in downtown Charleston, South Carolina. During a prayer service, Dylann Roof opened fire, killing nine black parishioners. Roof later confessed that he committed the shooting in hopes of igniting a race war, and his personal website revealed multiple symbols of white supremacy to include the Confederate flag. The massacre initiated debate about the modern relevance of the flag and ignited a movement to remove it from the grounds of the state capitol.

Protests moved beyond government pressure and into the private sector. Within one week of the mass shooting, six major retailers had removed Confederate merchandise from their shelves: Walmart, eBay, Sears, Target, Etsy, and Amazon. The removal of Confederate merchandise represented a controversial corporate position where many consumers argued in favor of the flag’s historical-political significance, separate the racist symbolism it (had) promoted. Shortly after the mass shooting, NASCAR (2015) –the preeminent American governing body for automotive races –issued a statement requesting fans refrain from displaying the flag in efforts to create “a more inclusive atmosphere, free from offensive symbols.” ESPN described the Confederate flag as “the flag of choice” for many NASCAR fans, although the racing association does not use it in any official capacity. Following the shooting, NASCAR launched a program where fans could exchange Confederate flags for American flags at no charge, but reports suggested the program was not embraced by race attendees.

Companies like NASCAR have become part of the increasing number of businesses engaging in corporate activism that epitomize an unprecedented trend with unquestionable public relations implications. REDACTED initially characterized corporate activism as a unique emergent phenomenon, relevant to public relations theory surrounding strategic issues management and corporate social responsibility. Corporate activism: (1) addresses controversial issues divorced from particular areas of relevance to traditional business operations; (2) has the potential to simultaneously isolate stakeholder groups and attract
activist groups; and (3) thus, places a necessary emphasis on understanding the organizational- and societal-level outcomes to which it gives rise (REDACTED).

SIM allows that corporate behavior is legitimized by stakeholder perceptions of how that behavior fits within societal beliefs about the ways in which organizations should behave. Companies create shared views with stakeholders about what may be an ever-changing standard through which corporate behavior is deemed acceptable or unacceptable. Stakeholder perceptions of corporate stances on social-political issues may differ across groups and individuals, ultimately impacting business goals. Controversial issues positions impact brand equity or the corporation’s “authority to speak on some matter and the power resources it can bring to bear on a market purchase, share value, or a governmental policy (Heath & Palenchar, 2009).”

Despite a strong theoretical underpinning, research must detail the historical climate that precipitated the emergence of corporate activism. It is through a historical lens that key themes and events materialize to paint a broader picture of the modern corporate relationship with society. Notably, public relations scholars of history have called for a move away from traditional approaches where specific events propel the histories of “great men (L’Etang et al., 2016; Watson, 2014). Rather, historians call for the situation of public relations as part of a greater dynamic social process and as facilitating/prohibiting social change.

**Method:** A historical examination of the evolution of corporate activism is best detailed as a chronological historical narrative. A historical perspective that traces the roots of corporate activism serves several important purposes: identify the climate within which the maturation of corporate activism occurred; encourage and position public relations expertise of a valuable interdisciplinary concept during a critical time in its development; open a dialogue about how public relations participates in policy outcomes for a democratic society; and propose recommendations for effective scholarly and professional methods moving forward.

Secondary resources are exclusively relied upon to position corporate activism within a timeline of key events and climate shifts. Resources are both scholarly and professional in nature to allow comprehensive positioning within public relations theory, but also inclusion of historical voices and stories that illuminate the broader context.

**Results/Discussion:** This completed research identifies key developments that gave way to modern corporate participation in controversial issues. The author begins with 19th century corporate misbehavior that led to widespread activism and government oversight in the 20th century. Public relations and CSR as foundations to corporate activism were born of the 20th century. The research concludes with modern expectations for business, arguing an increased emphasis on the activist role of business in meeting societal needs. It is through historical positioning across these developments that corporate activism has emerged and is legitimized in modern society.

**References**


ABSTRACT

The History of a Communication Management Revolution Led by Capitol Hill’s Press Secretaries

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This work describes the history of social media’s adoption and diffusion, over roughly the last quarter century, across the United States Congress. Those responsible for this cybertechnology dispersion have been the institution’s public relations professionals—that is, its press secretaries who today continue to serve each of the institution’s 435 representatives and 100 senators.

The paper begins with the recognition that throughout the United States, since the position of “Congressional press secretary” started to become a fully designated post in the early 1970s, average citizens have absorbed the portrayals the press secretaries created, and participated in the democratic process based upon what they have learned. Although policy positions and issue stances have come directly from the national politicians served by the press secretaries, the messages leading to and describing these choices often have been carefully crafted, gerrymandered, and dexterously served to the public by this group Congressional communication managers—thus shaping the perceptions of the Silent Generation, the Baby Boomers, Generation X, Generation Y, and Generation Z across United States and abroad.

Having established the role of the press secretaries as catalysts for Capitol Hill’s external communications, the paper next tracks the step-by-step evolution, over roughly a quarter century, of how social media’s roll-out across the U.S. Congress has increasingly: (1) provided the press secretaries with the ability to "converse with" rather than to "talk at" their audiences; (2) allowed anybody—reporters, constituents, activists—to send messages about any thing, at any time, to anyone, without regard for accuracy, thus opening the door to a number of unruly voices in political cyberspace; and (3) required press secretaries to make choices about which voices to listen/respond to, thus requiring them to make “communication decisions” at a pace unimagined only a few decades prior.

Next the paper discusses how the press secretaries’ interactions with journalists have changed concurrent with the advent and rapid spread of social media across Capitol Hill. Among these changes are “the press secretaries’ new ability to bypass traditional news outlets and instead use new media to reach publics directly (ignoring established reporters all together), and the press secretaries’ use of sophisticated computer-based analytical tools to tailor and segment their messages” (Downes, 2016). Meanwhile, virtual communities allow individuals/groups to scrutinize the political decisions of the politicians the press secretaries faithfully serve, albeit without third-party filters traditional new outlets always provided. Thus, for the first time in history “social media”—absent traditional journalists—have evolved as powerful “watchdog functions” over Member of Congress’ political choices and
behaviors that was once largely, even solely, the domain of the Fourth Estate (Downes, 2015, 2016).

The paper goes on to suggest that in today’s social media environment “communication history’s theoretical foci must be updated in order to help us to better understand contemporary Congressional communication management systems.” To illustrate this need the paper references three seminal mass communication theories (Gatekeeping Theory, Agenda-Setting Theory, and the Two-Step Flow Theory), each specifically from the perspective of Congressional communication management. It suggests that the antecedent conditions on which each theory was built must be revisited if those theories want to address “Congress in a cyber-world.” Starting with reference to Grunig’s early work, the paper goes on to suggest today’s public relations scholars building the field’s theoretical base must increasingly, perhaps continually, “revisit and refocus on social media’s rapidly, seemingly endless, influences on mass communication theory in general and public relations theory specifically.” This portion of the paper concludes with comments on the historical evolution of broadband, cyberculture, cyberethics, freenet and other platforms/transmission techniques/areas of intellectual inquiry that, broadly speaking, influenced the evolution of social media on Capitol Hill.

The paper concludes with two areas of discussion. The first suggests that despite the dramatic computer-based changes social media brought to the public relations field, the influencing processes the Congressional press secretaries draw on that awaken, form, reinforce, solidify, or change constituents’ public opinions—despite the diffusion of new media—in many ways have not changed (Downes, 2015). Simply put: Press secretaries who can create, find, or determine “good stories” will, with those stories, as they always have, more likely pique their publics’ interests. The second suggests that those playing the role of “press secretary” for legislators across the globe, particularly in the developed world, have experienced many of the same public relations/communication management opportunities and challenges Congress’ press secretaries have encountered over the last 25 years.

To solidify a base for on which to build its findings, roughly 10% of the paper is dedicated to summarizing three former IHPRC presentations: “The History of the Adoption and Diffusion of New Media—With a Public Relations Emphasis—and a Congressional Focus” (Downes, 2016); “The History of Capitol Hill’s Press Secretaries: Helping Member of Congress ‘Look Good’ for Almost 50 Years” (Downes 2015); and “The (Very Deep) Evolution of the Congressional Press Secretary and the Importance (or Lack Thereof) of an Informed Democracy” (Downes, 2014).

The remaining 90% of the paper presents a synthesis of brand new material generated from approximately 30 secondary sources as well as from a series of on-going, semi-structured phone interviews with former and current Congressional press secretaries examining, among other topics, their impressions of social media’s evolution on Congressional communications.
Abstract

How did the UK government communications service resist and respond to the challenges of media transformation and the rise of ‘political spin’ after 1997?

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Introduction

This paper presents the findings of an empirical analysis of the institutional dynamics that operate at the interface between government and the media in a liberal democracy, taking the UK as a case study. I examine how the government communications service navigated between its core values and the increasingly mediated democratic public sphere, asking how and to what extent media change from the 1980s onwards affected the capacity of the service to adapt, express, plan and deliver in relation to its public purposes and objectives, both implicit and explicit. I will argue that the arrival of the New Labour government in 1997 with a radical approach to 24/7 strategic communications exploited the weaknesses and threatened the resilience of a communications structure that had been in place since 1945, while enabling the service to become more responsive to ministers and the media. Before 1997 the drive by politicians to exert greater control over government messaging was taking place covertly, contributing towards a decline in civil service autonomy that has also been observed in a number of liberal democracies and which challenges accepted notions of impartiality (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010; Hood, 2015; Page, 2007). This paper applies a novel approach to the familiar narrative of ‘political spin’, challenging the assumption that government communications is either a neutral professional function or an inherently unethical form of distorted communication. As part of its attempt to neutralise what it saw as the default right-wing bias of the national media, Labour set a precedent and transformed the rules of engagement between government and the media which persists today (Hewitt, 2012; Macintyre, 1999).

Methodology

This study used in-depth interviews with former, largely middle-ranking, departmental government communicators who had served at various points between the 1960s and 2014, who had spent their working lives in close proximity to ministers during a time of increasing media scrutiny. These witness accounts were augmented by the voices of journalists and politically-appointed special advisers, together with archival and documentary analysis, and biographical accounts and memoirs, to ask how the cultural and structural capacities of the service changed over time, and whether 1997 was really a turning point for government communications. The resilience of the service was examined in the light of three historical developments: the establishment of the Government Information Service after 1945 as a separate network within the civil service; the role of politicians in instigating innovation and change, not just after 1997, but following the Thatcher victory of 1979; and institutional
attempts to make explicit the public purposes of government communications in the light of a series of publicized scandals in from 1997 onwards. The Labour governments of 1997-2010 were hit by a series of controversies related to ‘political spin’, most notably the publication of the Iraq dossier of September 2002, and after 2010 there were high profile resignations by special advisers due to public relations misconduct. What was it about civil service culture and practice that allowed such abuses to happen, despite the overwhelming continuing stated attachment to the ideal of impartiality? In the long term, what effect have successive reforms had on the autonomy and public purposes of the service?

Findings and conclusions

The three main findings of the study were that there was an almost wholesale change in government communications leadership after the 1997 and 2010 elections; that communications officials consistenly experienced a culture of disdain on the part of the mainstream civil service; and that the arrival of media special advisers led to a dramatic change in the rules of engagement for managing government news after 1997 that continues today. The evidence presented here suggests that although, the structure of government communications showed remarkable resilience in the face of media transformation, beneath the surface, significant changes took place from the 1980s, accelerating after 1997, that challenged the UK government’s capacity to deliver an impartial, trusted and credible public information service. Above all, the increasingly vulnerability of the head of profession and departmental directors of communication threatened the autonomy of the service. The mainstream civil service could do little to resist the attack on a part of the service that it undervalued, distrusted and barely understood. More broadly, the subtle rules of engagement and proprieties that had ensured that the service functioned without being seen to be unduly propagandist before 1997 were placed under threat after 1997, when the need to feed the increasingly hungry media beast combined forces with the demand from Labour to use any means possible to turn their media deficit into an electoral asset (Campbell & Stott, 2007). This process continued during the post-2010 Coalition period.

The one effort to strengthen the service by introducing a set of explicit public values, the 2004 Phillis Review into Government Communications, was abandoned after 2010 in a ‘year zero’ approach to history which prioritised the needs of the government of the day (Phillis, 2004). The government information service was founded in 1945 at the behest of politicians and with no built-in accountability mechanism (Moore, 2006) and without widely-understood and shared public values there can be no public accountability. Post-1997 reforms such as the abolition of the COI, the introduction of media special advisers, and the de facto introduction of politicized leadership within government communications have further strengthened the ‘political grip’ over government communications (Gregory, 2012; Horton & Gay, 2011). Meanwhile, the commitment to political neutrality in principle is regularly re-stated by politicians and in propriety guidance, and seen as a vital ingredient in maintaining impartiality and hence public trust. In practice, policing the line between party political propaganda and public information is a bureaucratic function which is at odds with politicians’ desire to act, and to act quickly. This ethos challenges the efficacy of the current system of internal regulation and suggests that more formal external accountability is needed.
to make explicit a set of generally accepted and applicable rules by which a genuinely citizen-focused government communications service can be evaluated and upheld.

References


ABSTRACT

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In May 2010 the Coalition Government led by David Cameron came to power with a pledge to reduce the country's deficit. In the same month, a freeze was placed on all Government marketing and advertising. For the remainder of the Coalition administration and for the duration of the subsequent Conservative Government under his Premiership, expenditure on Government Communication continued to be constrained. The Government Communication Plan for 2015/16 (GCS, 2015) states “We’ve already reduced Government spending on communications by half a billion pounds a year, but at the same time increased the effectiveness and capability of government communicators” (p.2).

This paper describes, analyses and draws conclusions about the significant changes in Government Communication in the Cameron years. These changes were driven principally by cost-constraints, but this was not the only driver for reform. Looking at these changes within a historical context, the paper also provides a conceptual model of Government communication from 1900 up to and including the period under examination.

The methodological approach to this paper is qualitative using a variety of methods. Ethnographic research, including non-participant and participant observation, was augmented by in-depth, semi-structured interviews with six senior managers in the Government Communication Service (GCS), five senior operational managers and two external experts who have significant experience in or of Government communication. This primary research has been supplemented by secondary sources including the academic literature and Government papers most of which are in the public domain, but some of which the author had privileged access to.

The developments in Government communication from 2010 to June 2016 are presented in five sections: first context is provided through a brief overview of the philosophy and origins of organised Government Communication in the UK from its beginnings in the 19th Century to 2010. Included in this is reference to the changes in the civil service more broadly, in particular the change from the Schafferian (Schaffer, 1973) public service bargain as described in Hood and Lodge’s typology (Hood, 2000; Hood & Lodge, 2006) to a managerial model (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002).

Second, the structural and operational changes introduced in 2011 by a Committee chaired by George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer are described and discussed, along with the author’s interpretation of their impact.

Third, the changes and their impact are discussed under three headings: structural change, operational change and culture change. Finally conclusions are drawn from the
discussion and a novel conceptual model of four chronological stages of Government communication presented. This periodization (Bentele, 2015) of Government Communication serves to highlight in schematic terms the changes in orientation in UK Government communication and its defining characteristic from 1900 to 2016. The conclusion also postulates that from these antecedents some of the reasons for the UK Government being surprised about the UK public voting to leave the European Union, can be discerned.

References


ABSTRACT

The United States Information Agency and US Racial Problems in the 1950s and 1960s

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Established in 1953 by President Dwight Eisenhower, the United States Information Agency (USIA) sought to create awareness and understanding of United States foreign policy by promoting mutual understanding between the United States and other nations through a broad range of overseas informational, cultural, and educational programs. One of the USIA’s missions was to project a favorable image of the United States to other countries and correct misperceptions about the nation, its people and its policies.

In an article about the work of the USIA in the Public Relations Journal, the magazine of the Public Relations Society of America, the author wrote that the United States has the “best of all products to sell: democracy, freedom, human dignity, peace. And as all public relations men know, the ultimate success of a campaign hinges on the real worth of the product” (Cushing, 1958). However, the USIA encountered difficulty in selling these products overseas. During the Cold War, the United States was attempting to win the allegiance of many nations, while positioning itself as a worldwide arbiter of freedom. With this visible position on the world stage, foreigners paid greater attention to the United States than they had before World War II. However during the 1950s and 1960s, international attention to America’s racial problems undermined United States foreign policy, which was intended to promote democracy and contain the threat of communism. Through news accounts, citizens of other countries realized that the United States did not give its black citizens the freedoms it demanded of other countries. The hypocrisy perpetuated by America’s espousal of freedom and its contradictory treatment of its black citizens was noted by its enemies, and the Soviet Union was quick to report on racial incidents in the United States. Ongoing and escalating racial problems in the United States continued to undermine its global reputation.

In response, the USIA developed a number of public relations strategies and provided related guidance to its overseas offices. Through an examination of primary source historical documents as well as secondary sources, this study examines the public relations strategies the USIA employed to help manage the reputation of the United States overseas in response to the country’s racial problems. It also reviews the USIA’s accounting of media coverage of racial incidents in relation to its strategies. In addition, this study examines the outcome of some of the USIA’s public relations efforts by reviewing results of public opinion polling, which provide data on foreign citizens’ perceptions of the United States at the time, specifically in relation to racial issues. This study shows how a governmental agency used public relations to counter a threat to foreign policy in the midst of significant social change.
References


ABSTRACT

Eat this, don’t eat that: An analysis of social influence tactics in the American Sow the Seeds of Victory Campaign of World War I

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One hundred years ago, the adoption of the 1917 Food and Fuel Control Act and the creation of the U.S. Food Administration established a relationship between government and diet that is still felt today.

Efforts to persuade people to alter their eating habits are often met with opposition, such as the realities of transforming public school lunch menus as part of First Lady Michelle Obama’s Let’s Move campaign, the United States Department of Agriculture’s rule to remove junk food vending machines from schools, or New York City’s controversial and failed attempt to ban large sugary drinks.

As head of the newly created U.S. Food Administration, Herbert Hoover became a ruler of food during World War I, combining tactics of cooperation and coercion to elevate food as a tool of war and food conservation as a test of patriotism. The Food Administration’s Sow the Seeds of Victory campaign used common tactics of the day, including posters, pamphlets, and brochures in an effort to influence attitudes and ensure participation. These materials became significant communication tactics and widely distributed. For example, even though America didn’t enter the war until 1917, according to the Library of Congress, more posters were produced by the U.S. than any other country. Distribution included a wide range of locations such as churches, schools, and homes.

A merger of advertising and art, war posters, in particular, have been analyzed and valued for their aesthetic appeal and use of imagery. And, while food conservation was an important theme for both world wars, the U.S. WWI posters tended to have more text and be more informative in nature (Fiegl, 2010).

The current study applies Cialdini’s theory of influence tactics and concept of pre-susasion in a content analysis of the language used in the Food Administration’s WWI campaign. While a study of influence tactics doesn’t measure the direct impact of a particular ad or pamphlet, it may help scholars better understand the communication strategies used and the context that made this war-time campaign successful.

References


ABSTRACT

The Emergence of Governmental Information Services in British Malaya: Exploring the Antecedent Growth to Malaysian Public Relations

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This article covers the emergence of the first form of Governmental information services in Malaysia. The article gives an account of the importance of the information services in the historical development of the Malaysian Public Relations. The objective of this paper is to look into the origin of the first formal Information Agency in British Malaya and to evaluate how the early information services aided the British economic consolidation during the economic boom and the economic depression years in British Malaya (1910 - 1934).

The early colonial information services has always been linked to the prolific use of propaganda especially during World War 1 and World War 2 (Idid, 1995). Most often these services were in the form of propaganda agencies under the controlling governments and were often labelled as ‘information’ offices or committees. Some of the common examples include- the office of war information (OWI: 1942-1945), the committee on public information (1917-1919) and the Ministry of Information formed in 1939 that was the central government department responsible for publicity and propaganda in the Second World War. According to Anderson (1989) many of the early information offices that were run by the local governments have been the forerunners of the PR sector in the UK. The current paper attempts to trace the history of the information offices in Malaysia and explores its evolution as a precursor to the PR sector in Malaysia.

The need to gain control over the colonies and to establish local self-governments led to the introduction of information departments and agencies in the colonial empires. Higgs (2003) believes that the transition of the nation state to an ‘information state’ is an innovation linked to the Industrial revolution. He emphasizes that the role of information gathering is seen by a sociologist as a way of social control. Thus in order to keep control over the colonies, and to prevent actions against the established social system, it was needed to indulge in information gathering. This could explain why the early British and the French empires were keen on introducing information agencies and departments in their colonies. This could have triggered the introduction of the first information agency in British Malaya.

The British way of introducing self-government started with the introduction of a system of ‘agencies’ to deal with their colonial affairs (Shannon, 1952). The British Empire took control over the constitution of their colonies and tried to individualize each country’s constitution to fit to its specific needs. Significant attention was also given to the gathering and organizing information in colonies in order to gain total control over their lands and colonies and to fulfil the agenda of the British. Sharma (1992) claims that the British collected extensive data and information on Indian Society to obtain a better understanding of the colony, culture, customs and beliefs. Likewise in Malaya, the British Government
introduced the Malay States Information Agency on October 1910 with the objective to publicize the productions and attractions of the States of Malay Peninsula under British Protection to prospective investors, government officials, and travellers.

The period from 1909-1910 is a notable period in Malaya that witnessed several developments and advancements. The advent of Motor Industry in this period led to the rubber boom era in Malaya and prompted further explorations and developments of the Malay lands. Through the transfer of sovereignty from Siam in 1909, the British Empire established their geographical limits and sphere of control over the Malayan Peninsula. Concurrently the British Government was able to take large programmes of Public works—railways, bridges, postal and telegraph services in the Malayan lands and concentrate don bringing order to the colony. Thus the expansion and development prompted a need for information and publicity services thus triggering the formation of the first information agency. The escalating events of the era was brought to halt in 1920 with the starting of a period of depression. This period was marked by devastated markets of all products that led to reduced income, reduced Government officials and retrenchment (1930-1932). Furthermore the political arena was marked by the British Empire facing a threat from Japan in the east and United States in the West.

The current paper incorporates a qualitative approach that includes a search for a confirmation inferred from a range of written and printed archival evidence. The resultant history is organized chronologically and presented. It is evident that the development of the early information services moulded itself to fit to the changing demands of the Malayan colony and the British consolidation of power over the Malay colonies. The paper attempts to explore into the early influences that could have shaped the coming of the public relations department in British Malaya. In line with what Tom Watson (2015) proposes, it is evident that the antecedents and springboards of Malaysian PR are to be found within the British colonial Government in the forms of the Malay States Information Department.

References


ABSTRACT

Public Relations, Emergency Relief, and the Military at St. Ottilien

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This study documents the public relations campaign that culminated in “The Miracle at St. Ottilien.” It questions the military’s role in creating a humanitarian crisis there, activists’ under-the radar appropriation of military resources for relief, and a lack of transparency that was only resolved when the government, i.e., Harry Truman stepped in. Should the campaign be hailed as successful crisis communication? Do desperate times call for desperate PR measures? Does the profession provide a bar from which to evaluate this? Are scholars/practitioners, who do not have “boots on the ground,” equipped to do so?

In the summer of 1945, shortly after the Allied victory over the Nazis and the liberation of the concentration camps, two young American private were stationed at a U.S. army base near Munich. Not far from them was St. Ottilien, first a monastery, then a German military hospital, and after the war, a displaced persons (DP) camp. The hospital and grounds, filled with refugees, included survivors of Dachau, about 30 miles away.

Robert Hilliard, 19, and Edward Hermann, 25, were veterans of the Battle of the Bulge. Hilliard was assigned to the base as an army reporter. He learned of a humanitarian crisis brewing on the grounds of St. Ottilien, went to investigate, and encountered what he dubbed “genocide by neglect.” He then brought Hermann to witness firsthand the food shortages, the lack of medicine and medical care for the malnourished and ill, the insufficient shelter, clothing, and supplies, and most shocking, the barbed-wire fences containing the prisoners. The men knew that prisoners were dying daily from the effects of Nazi death and labor camps; the conditions of their internment at St. Ottilien, including an impending winter without sufficient resources, and the effects of barbed wire on prisoner psyches (again), could exponentially increase that death toll.

Hilliard and Hermann implemented an immediate relief plan, with Hermann in charge of logistics. The subsequent public relations campaign aimed to both raise awareness of the refugee situation and acquire the requisite resources before winter set in. To aid the survivors, Hilliard and Hermann circumvented army protocol and bureaucracy and enlisted the help of fellow soldiers. In short, one rationale for their “requisition,” i.e., spiriting of food and supplies from the kitchen and elsewhere, was that immediate action was needed. Their campaign, though, went beyond raiding the pantry and the pharmacy.

Hermann and Hilliard, assisted by their fellow soldiers and a few “outsiders,” undertook an international campaign to raise awareness of the crisis and above all, to change military policy towards the survivors. St. Ottilien may have been a glaring example of “genocide by neglect,” but it was not the only one. With the help of an “underground” printer, Hilliard and Hermann embarked on a letter-writing campaign and printed over 1000 graphic letters describing conditions in the camps and requesting donations of supplies and
clothing. They engaged the help of rank-and-file soldiers to mail letters to friends and relatives. Yet donations for relief never arrived and winter approached rapidly.

One letter reached the desk of President Truman, who sent an envoy to investigate. Once conditions at the camp were confirmed, the crates with donations were shipped (customs and the military had held them at the docks), just in time for winter. Despite this success, Hilliard and Hermann experienced a backlash and intimidation from top Army officers, but continued their campaign. The resulting policy change by the military improved conditions not only in St. Ottilien but across DP camps, many of which were primary residences for survivors for many years after liberation.

In retrospect, this seemingly “ad hoc” crisis response was executed with more guts than advance planning and ran rings around the established military order. Yet by exploring the ethical issues and the attendant humanitarian benefits it elicited, a richer discourse about public relations’ pro-social mandate may ensue. The study will explore PR and related literatures, professionals’ perspectives, and firsthand accounts of those at St. Ottilien. History can be a catalyst, setting public relations benchmarks to govern practices in extreme circumstances and advance the profession in a millennium of great uncertainty.
ABSTRACT

Public Relations and the FDA: Proactive Measures and Responding to Negative Product Outcomes

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According to its recent mission statement (24 Oct. 2016), “The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices; and by ensuring the safety of our nation's food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.” It has oversight of the following areas: animal and veterinary products, cosmetics, children’s products, dietary supplements, drugs, medical devices, radiation-emitting products, tobacco, vaccines, blood, and biologics (FDA, 2017).

As a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the FDA has dealt with routine releases about new approved pharmaceutical and other products, recalls of flawed drugs and devices, fallout from the repercussions of recalls and sometimes-prolonged drug trials and approval processes that may result in an outcry for “compassionate use,” and other unanticipated crises. In addition, as a small but highly significant part of a larger federal behemoth, the FDA is highly visible and often called on to testify to various committees within Congress.

Where has the FDA’s public relations (or public affairs, the usual appellation in government agencies) been situated within its larger mandate, and how has it functioned to respond to the impact of an ever-expanding range of products within its oversight? How has it been equipped to react to the backlash of approved products that have sometimes failed to produce results they have touted or worse, have triggered bodily harm or deaths?

This presentation will explore the history of the FDA’s public affairs, its organizational structure, and the mechanisms by which it deals with routine and non-routine public relations issues. It will discuss if and how, the FDA’s structure and practices are congruent with, or deviate from, public relations practices in other areas of the non-profit and corporate world. Have the FDA’s operations and crisis communication appeared consistent with the best practices of that given time? How has FDA’s public affairs navigated the delicate balance between informing its publics about its regulation of industry, its approval of products it deems safe to market, and its responses to crises? How has it dealt with unanticipated snags and public concerns about its functioning and decisions? As a government agency within a broader bureaucratic structure, has its accountability and social responsibility been helped or hindered by that larger structure?

The author will provide examples of crises involving the FDA that have had serious implications for public health and safety. Among these are the Johnson & Johnson Tylenol recalls of 2007 and thereafter (in contrast with the recalls of the 1980s), the Vioxx controversy, the 2012 fatal outbreak of meningitis from contamination in a compounding pharmacy, the “compassionate use” dilemma in the Josh Hardy case, and others. Through
exploring the FDA’s responses to these crises from both theoretical framework and empirical public relations practices, the author will attempt to assess how FDA’s public affairs was in line with mainstream practices of the time. Has FDA’s public affairs had to “change gears” at any point and craft a plan or response that was inconsistent with previous strategies or tactics, and if so, why was that choice made and what, if any, impact did the change have on public perception and/or policy? Is it feasible to apply public relations industry and CSR benchmarks to the FDA, as federal agency?

The author will consult the public relations literature, FDA documents, pharmaceutical/ food and other relevant industry literature and Web sites. In addition, the author plans to interview employees of the FDA as well as those who cover the FDA’s media activities and public relations/health communication experts who track FDA rulings and responses to crises.
ABSTRACT

Post-WW2 Transition of Tokyo’s Government PR: Democratization, Politicization and Optimization

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the 70-year history of public relations by Tokyo’s municipal government since its democratization following the WW2. In Japan, as in some other countries, democratization is often considered to mark the beginning of PR in their country. However, as Tampere (2006) pointed out, transition societies, or societies that shifted its political system from communism and socialism to democracy, experience years of confusion in adopting the concept and practice of PR that place importance on disclosure and two-way communication. This paper looks into the case of a municipal government that went through such transition period to explore the path it took to incorporate such PR and what happened since. As this paper is a sequel to Kunieda (2013) that looked into the prehistory of Tokyo’s PR since 1868 to 1945, the author will also discuss its relation to Tokyo’s post-WWII experience in detail.

The methodology for this paper is literature review, with major focus on the history of its departmental structure. This paper tracked the PR-related departments, their transition and activities from 1945 to present day using official documents and secondary sources.

The main findings of this research are that the Tokyo’s post-WWII experience with PR can be organized into three main periods. The first period is from 1945 to 1959, the years of institutionalization. These years are characterized by the gradual accumulation of PR departments and functions that were unprecedented. While Tokyo already had multiple institutionalized methods to communicate with the public and while it had established departments dedicated to PR functions since 1934, the manner of communication was often one directional, with very limited two-way communication occurring with the public. After WWII, Tokyo began to establish PR departments at the highest level of organizational structure under the mayor, with subsections for different PR functions such as information dissemination (on government, city planning, tourism, etc.) and gathering people’s voices. Institutionalized practice of PR grew, with greater number and frequency of publications, radio and TV programs. People had new ways of voicing their opinions to the government through telephone calls, letters, public events, public opinion polls, etc. The rapidly growing channels of communication with the government and the people marked the beginning of the age of democratic PR.

However, PR becomes a political topic from around 1959 to 1979 as corruption among politicians caught public attention. Mayors used PR as a symbolic method to ease public dissatisfaction with the government. PR department grew in size and function as public criticisms of Tokyo government intensified. New system of gathering critical voices were announced, mayors began to communicate directly with the public more frequently,
communication within the government were improved, and all such reforms were attempted with corruption issues in mind, unlike during the first period.

Tokyo experienced the greatest level of democratic government-public communication during the 60s and 70s, which lost enthusiasm by the 80s. PR departments were gradually restructured and decreased in size, mayors communicated less with the public while more emphasis was put on media relations. PR was not seen as a symbolic solution to Tokyo’s issues anymore. There are several political, economic and social backgrounds that may be attributed to this change, but the stability of PR departments since the 90s may be a sign that Tokyo managed to optimize its PR practice for good or for bad.

While the extensive use of Internet services for PR functions today and success in winning the bid for 2020 Olympics may seem like developments in the PR front, the PR activities by the government nowadays are often criticized by the media as being manipulative. After 70 years of democratic PR practice, Tokyo seems to have lost its expectation for two-directional PR in solving its issues. Tokyo’s experience may be a rather singular one, but it shows how the structure, functions and expectations of governmental PR change after its democratization.

References


ABSTRACT

‘The Irish Problem’: Recruiting to the British Armed Forces in Ireland Before and After the Easter Rising, 1914-19

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In the past thirty years the historical development of public relations in Ireland has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Because of the extraordinary complexity of its domestic political scene and the many religious and cultural conflicts that have underpinned it, much of the commentary has focused on Northern Ireland and the period of the Troubles in particular (see Miller, 1994; Curtis, 1998; Stannard, 1999; Somerville and Purcell, 2011; Somerville, Purcell and Morrison, 2011; Somerville and Kirby, 2012; Rice and Somerville, 2013). More recently, attention has begun to shift to the pre-Troubles era and to Ireland as a whole, with Bernadette Whelan (2003), for instance, exploring the role played by film, broadcast and print media in promoting the Marshall Plan in Ireland in 1947-51 and Martin McLoone (2000) considering the relationship between Irish broadcasting and cultural identity in the 1920s and 1930s. Kevin Hora’s (2017) forthcoming Propaganda and Nation Building: Selling the Irish Free State, part of Routledge’s rapidly expanding New Directions in Public Relations and Communications Research series, promises an exploration of the interplay between nationalism, religion and public relations during the same period, and some studies of the Irish Republic, which existed for a short time in 1919-21, have also recently surfaced (see, for example, Kenneally, 2008).

Ireland has provided such a fertile ground for public relations scholarship precisely because it has been – and arguably continues to be – a ‘divided society’ (Somerville et al., forthcoming). Over the course of modern and medieval history, many competing interest groups vied for control over the mainland, with divisions opening up between north and south, within north and south, and between Ireland and the United Kingdom. Ireland has shared a fraught relationship with Britain since the time of Henry VIII, but the development of public relations on Irish soil is usually traced to the twentieth century. The island of Ireland began that century as one of the UK’s four Home Nations, but was partitioned within two decades as part of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act which in turn led to the creation of an Irish Free State, a Dominion of the British Commonwealth formally inaugurated in 1923, and subsequently an Irish republic, an independent nation state that came into being in 1937 and exists to this day (see Vaughan, 2010; Hill, 2010). The causes of these events are the source of deep contestation among historians, although most observers point to the failure of repeated attempts to introduce Home Rule and the 1916 Easter Rising as milestones in Irish and by extension Northern Irish history.

It is the contention of this paper that these events, and British involvement in Ireland during and immediately after the Great War, can also be considered key moments in the development of Irish public relations. The declaration of war in August 1914 placed unique pressures on political and business leaders on both sides of the Irish Sea, and this in turn
helped to inspire some early forms of public relations. As was the case elsewhere in the UK, the main political parties in Ireland swung their support behind the war, with figures like John Redmond and Edward Carson taking to the podium to promote recruitment to the armed forces (McConnel, 2007). Yet oratory represented only part of the official recruitment drive in Ireland, with a number of specialist organisations also set up to mobilise the population using print media, films and a variety of public spectacles. A Parliamentary Recruiting Committee had been tasked with a similar objective in England, Scotland and Wales, and I recently argued that this body represented an early public relations organisation (Maartens, 2016). Yet little is known about equivalent developments in Ireland or the role played by recruiters in Irish society after the Great War had ended.

In this paper, I will address these shortcomings by giving a brief overview of recruiting work in Ireland during the Great War followed by a detailed account of one particular organisation, the Irish Recruiting Council (IRC), that came into being in 1918 and continued to operate for a short time after the war. The IRC was tasked with mobilising 50,000 men at a time when Ireland was experiencing a ‘conscription crisis’ (Ward, 1974), but neither it nor the other recruiting organisations have featured in published accounts of Irish public relations history. Indeed, though attempts to recruit Irish men of nationalist and unionist bent have long attracted the attention of political historians (see, for example, Jefferys, 2000; Gregory and Pesata, 2002; Grayson, 2010), little is known about the exchange of knowledge and creative practice that underpinned Irish recruiting activities in wartime. In the early stages of the conflict, Irish recruiters believed that they simply needed to repeat the tactics that had been used elsewhere in the UK. After the Easter Rising, however, it quickly became clear that a different approach was required that reflected the rapidly changing situation on the ground. Such developments have important implications not only for our understanding of Irish public relations history, but for the history of public relations in general, and I conclude my paper with a reflection on that.

References


In 2004, the Chief Executive of the Guardian Media Group Sir Robert Phillis published an independent review of UK government communications. Referring to a ‘three-way breakdown in trust between government and politicians, the media and the general public’, Phillis put forward a series of recommendations to rebuild the bridges that had apparently connected these domains in the past. There would be a redefinition of the role and scope of government communications, a greater degree of centralised control over it, and the replacement of the Government Information and Communications Service with an apparently more ‘authoritative’ Government Communications Network. Having been eroded by successive Conservative and Labour administrations, the ‘tradition’ of Civil Service impartiality would be restored through a ‘long-term programme of radical change’ that would renew public faith in the political process and increase voter turnouts at general elections (2004: 2).

The Phillis Review, as it became known, created some commotion on Fleet Street, with the *Times* praising its desire to ‘lift the veil of secrecy that covers Whitehall business’ (19 January 2004) and the *Guardian* suggesting that blame for the breakdown in trust should be shared equally among journalists and politicians (20 January, 2004). Six years of New Labour rule under Tony Blair and his notorious Communications Director Alistair Campbell provided the context for these remarks and the catalyst for the review, which was ordered in the wake of a series of scandals involving Special Advisors and Cabinet Ministers. Temporary civil servants not obliged to act with impartiality, Special Advisors had occupied a place within the machinery of government since the time of John Maynard Keynes (Blick, 2004). Yet their position as de facto public relations consultants had become increasingly precarious. Accused by some of creating a ‘culture of spin’ (Hansard, 23 October, 2001: 149), they were identified in academic circles with a new type of ‘post-modern’ public relations (Harris, 2000: 13) which, as Kevin Moloney argued, was driven by a ‘new attitude and behaviour towards the media…[characterised by a]ggression towards journalists [and] the withdrawal of respect or deference for them as a Fourth Estate protected constitutionally in order to scrutinise government’ (2002: 127).

Such an aggressive approach to media management was not, however, new and nor was the Phillis Review the first (or indeed last) official enquiry into relations between the state, the Fourth Estate and public opinion. In 2008, a House of Lords Select Committee on Communications was appointed to consider reforms in the wake of the 2004 review. Three years later, a different review into paid-for communications was carried out by Matt Tee, the outgoing Permanent Secretary for Government Communications. The following year, Lord
Justice Leveson released half of his long-awaited report into the culture, practice and ethics of the press, but the second part has yet to be published.

As early as 1878, a Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting was established to examine ways of improving newspaper coverage of parliamentary affairs. In 1912, a Joint Committee on Admiralty, War Office and Press Representatives, probably the first body of its kind to operate in Britain, was created to manage the flow of official information in wartime (DEFE 53/1). How politicians and civil servants used newspapers to curry favour with the public formed the basis of several subsequent interwar, wartime and post-war enquiries, which give a good sense of the range of devices and techniques used to ‘sell’ the state in Britain and the institutions responsible for developing them.

These institutions have not lacked scholarly attention, but much of the existing commentary has focused on specific periods, such as the Thatcher and Blair years (Franklin, 1994, 1999, 2003; Pitcher, 2003; Khun, 2005), the interwar era (Grant, 1994; Anthony, 2012: chs. 1-4) or the immediate aftermath of the Second World War (Crofts, 1989; Moore, 2006). Accounts that do consider the full sweep of government promotion tend to be restricted to brief summaries (Gregory, 2012: 369-70; Franklin, 1999: 18-19) or quasi-official surveys that treat the subject as an innocuous act of distributing ‘information’ to impartial journalists and appreciative publics (Ogilvy-Webb, 1965; Clark, 1970). Less is known about the long-term trends that characterised official press relations in the UK, the impact they had on other forms of promotion, and the continuity and change that lay at the heart of the practice.

This paper addresses these limitations by giving listeners a broad overview of government press relations in Britain. Beginning in the late Victorian era and ending with the collapse of social democracy at the tail-end of the 1970s, it highlights key milestones and developments, such as the formation of the Westminster Lobby in 1884, the creation of departmental press bureaux during the Great War, and the establishment of the position of Chief Press Liaison Officer to the Prime Minister in 1931. Covering so much ground obviously precludes detailed analysis of any particular organisation or practitioner, but there is a precedent for a ‘timeline narrative’ approach in the literature on public relations (see Watson, 2012). A chronological overview can also reveal how press relations, as they came to be known and understood within the sphere of national government, shaped other forms of promotion found in Britain at the time. Official attempts to manage newspapers, as we shall see, both preceded and helped to inspire certain forms of political propaganda and public relations, and I conclude my paper with a reflection on that.

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ABSTRACT


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The Bank of England in its 2015 Annual Report summed up its role as “The Bank exists to promote the public good as expressed in its charter and governing legislation.” (Bank of England, 2014, p.68, my emphasis). A similar term appears on the organisation’s web site home page, “Promoting the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability.” (Bank of England, 2016, my emphasis). The Bank links this use of language to its founding charter in 1694, (making it one of the oldest central banks in the world). In communication terms this can also be seen as seeking legitimacy or more precisely social legitimacy and support to its current claim by showing a historical link to its founding charter.

Although no media outlet commented apparently on this claim, the use of discourse such as the “public good” is noteworthy, we might even say radical, for a powerful institution such as the Bank of England. For example the 2008 Bank of England web site, just prior to the financial crash in a previous Governor’s regime says, “The Bank sets interest rates to keep interest rates low and works to maintain a stable financial system” (Bank of England, 2008) – a technocratic description which shows a very different interpretation of the organisation’s role and identity compared with linking the Bank’s role to the “public good”.

The path that the Bank of England has taken since its nationalisation in 1946 in terms of addressing “public interest” agendas has been anything but straightforward even though the current Governor picked up the words “public interest” from its founding charter in 1693. Each year the Bank of England produces an Annual Report and these are all available on the Bank’s web site going back to 1947 – the year after it was nationalised (Bank of England, 2017). Each of the Annual Reports has been analysed to identify discourse, announcements, and management processes which indicate a developing public interest agenda at the Bank.

The 70 years of the Annual Reports provide an important archival resource for an important national and international organisation as it addresses issues around legitimacy increasingly influenced by political and societal agendas. The Reports show that the process of starting to think and act as a public body serving all sectors of society was a slow process. Reports from the 1960s do start to show a different perspective. The Annual Reports start to talk about the impact of the economy on consumers and citizens, although the language is somewhat stilted and uses the term “person” to refer to consumers.

The Annual Report and the focus of the paper on social legitimacy also provides important insights into the development of public relations within the organisation.
Of course, this use of language is a very conscious decision by the Bank’s communications team and draws on the wider Strategic Review which the new Governor, Mark Carney announced in 2014 and is highlighted prominently in the 2015 Annual Report. We can surmise that the reason for this use of language and wider narrative, linking the Bank to the “public good” and “the good of the people”, is because of the great damage to the Bank’s reputation and the financial sector more widely, by the 2007/8 financial crash. It can also be seen as part of a wide ranging programme of action, to restore public trust in the Bank of England and the financial sector more generally.

Jeremy Warner, an experienced journalist in the sector writing in the Daily Telegraph in 2016 summed up a widespread public view on the banking sector that “…a bank’s ability to pay up on demand, to manage deposits honestly and safely, and to put the customer’s interests before all others, goes to the heart of public trust in money. These expectations were shattered by the crisis of 2007/8, when it appeared that bankers had lost all sense of the greater public good and were in it only for themselves.” (Warner, 2016).

In broad communication and strategic management terms, the Bank can be seen to be addressing issues of legitimacy or “licence to operate” agendas. By using such language and related imagery (a picture of the 1693 Charter with the phrase “public good” highlighted, p.4) in its Annual Report; it is seeking to reposition the way that stakeholders perceive the Bank. It is doing so, in a way which highlights an important societal role for the Bank – its public role serving the community. It could have taken a different path in its communications, for example, it might have emphasised its role at the heart of the City of London one of the world’s premier financial centres and its role regulating this market; instead it wanted to show its overall societal role and as a servant to the wider community. Clearly a change of discourse by itself will not change sentiment, but in communication terms it can be seen as a key message to indicate wider changes within the Bank which the Governor has initiated.

The pathway which has taken the Bank concept of organisational legitimacy or licence-to-operate, has a very long history going back to the medieval guilds (if not earlier) based around the legitimacy which came from regulations and restrictions, on goods and products and who could supply them in specific towns and cities. However the concept of legitimacy in a political and societal context is primarily associated with the growth of the merchant classes in Europe from the 15th century onwards; the growth of law and the slow transition of power from the monarchy towards emerging Parliamentary systems. The work of Kant, Hobbes and Locke is important in this respect. The concept of legitimacy was linked more clearly to the rights of citizens by the work of Rousseau, Thomas Paine and others in the 18th century sometimes known as the “Age of Reason” (Riley, 1982).

The growth of organisational law and regulation in the 19th century, notably with the formation of the limited liability company in 1862, further reinforced the role of law in corporate legitimation. The definition of legitimacy in the Oxford English Dictionary confirms the centrality of law and regulation. Milton Friedman’s famous quotation often linked with the primacy of the shareholder perspective that the “The social responsibility of
business is to increase its profits” (1970) can be seen as a process of legitimation based around a legal framework centred around the legal concept of profitability.

However, a number of commentators have highlighted that legitimacy is increasingly influenced by public opinion and discursive processes (Castells, 2009; Jensen, 2001; Holmstrom, 2008). In this context, the term social legitimacy is starting to be used more widely, although not exclusively. Discursive processes include the full range of engagement and communications by organisations with stakeholders and publics. In fact these discursive processes are frequently led by activist and political groups setting societal agendas or by what James Grunig would term active publics in his Situational Theory of Publics, rather than the organisation initiating the process. This highlights broader communication trends away from a one way or asymmetrical flow of communications towards a two way communication flow even if primarily asymmetrical rather than symmetrical. An important aspect of discursive processes with the growth of social media is that agendas and conversations are often co-created with active publics and key stakeholders.

Ansgar Zerfass (2008) says that corporate communications has both a market perspective and a legitimacy perspective. In his terminology; profitability and supporting the bottom line go alongside legitimacy and securing the licence to operate as summing up the two main functions of the corporate communications function. An earlier work by Inge Jensen in 2001, linked Habermas’ public sphere to organisational legitimacy. She said that organisations need to debate agendas in the public sphere to gain legitimacy. Jensen developed the concept of the third public sphere of “organisational legitimacy and identity” (Jensen, 2001).

The 2013 Barclays Bank Salz Review where a major figure outside the bank, even though part of the City establishment, was asked to review the company’s corporate culture and practices and produce a report with recommendations can be seen as an example of the type of reflective practice which Jensen recommends to gain legitimacy. (Although it should be noted that the new Barclays management who were not involved in commissioning the Salz Review, have now removed it from its web site showing lack of understanding of how issues of transparency can influence organisational legitimacy.)

These perspectives, from a PR and communications perspective, also intersect with corporate governance, social responsibility and accounting literature particularly around the concept of legitimacy theory (Blowfield, Murray, 2014, p.192). “The notion of a company existing only with the sanction of society, with connotations of a ‘public interest’ element to its continued existence, may have seemed fanciful, the events surrounding Enron and the collapse of Arthur Andersen...demonstrated that it is indeed possible to lose the licence to operate if one’s actions are seen to go beyond what society deems acceptable.”

Blowfield and Murray also seek to define licence to operate and place in context of corporate social responsibility. Their definition places issues around legitimacy as one heavily influenced by stakeholder relations and societal agendas. “...an organisation can only continue to exist if its core values are aligned with the core values of society in which it operates” (p.47). The authors have produced a spectrum of corporate responsibility roles and
actions, and “licence to operate” is positioned in Stage 2, termed Engaged with three further
stages leading towards “Transformation”. Their work is important in attempting to position
legitimacy in a range of corporate governance agendas.

Blowfield and Murray cite Lindblom (1994) as author who developed legitimacy
strategies for an organisation. These included: ‘align activities with expectations’, ‘educate
and inform’, ‘change perceptions’ or ‘alter perceptions’ (p.192).

What is noticeable is that this strand of legitimacy theory is situated more from the
perspective of the company seeking to control licence to operate agendas than from the
perspective of society and a range of active publics setting agendas which is more likely. In
communication terms, one might term this approach to communication change as
asymmetrical. More likely is that licence to operate agendas are often raised by small active
publics with media not yet on side.

For example the role of well informed independents such as Richard Murphy
commenting on tax issues provided important foundations when media, politicians and others
started to highlight the lack of tax paid by the major IT brands such as Google, Amazon and
Facebook. Tax is an example of a legitimacy issue which has caught out many major
companies.

The corporate communications function within an organisation is only part of the
business functions involved with addressing issues of legitimacy. However the role of public
opinion and the discursive nature of legitimacy as suggested by commentators does suggest
that the corporate communications function should have a good understanding of legitimacy
issues facing the organisation and an important role in the organisation’s strategy to address
them. However, the doctorate does not assume that all companies in the finance sector will
necessarily have a sensitivity to these issues although the guidance provided by the Bank of
England, a thought and regulatory leader in the sector, is surely significant.

The choice of the financial sector to explore these processes is deliberate. The
finance sector provides legitimacy agendas and issues which are perhaps more complex and
multi-dimensional due to the power and influence of the financial sector. This combined
with the loss of public confidence following the financial crash the issues faced by PR and
corporate communications practitioners in addressing legitimacy agendas can be seen as
perhaps more challenging than other sectors. This aspect enhances the value of the research
into communications practice in the sector. The financial sector also has a strong
communications consultancy industry supporting the sector.

The financial sector has always been an area of interest and my early PR career with a
small FTSE high technology company, UEI plc, included managing its investor relations as
part of the corporate communications role with the company. Greenwich also provides a
strong base for studying financial markets, close to Canary Wharf and with Accounting and
Finance Department within the Business faculty but also with the Centre for Governance,
Risk and Accountability within the faculty providing a pool of expertise to draw on.
While legitimacy agendas in terms of communications theory have a strong body of work to draw on (Jensen, 2001; Holmstrom, 2008; Zerfass, 2008; Gregory 2011, Steyn) in terms of communications practice this is a relatively under-explored area of work. It can also be argued that the concept of PR practitioners seeing themselves as helping organisations address issues of legitimacy is also less well defined and this will be an important aspect to explore in the doctorate.

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ABSTRACT

About olive trees and broccoli: A history of political party emblems in the 20th and 21st century

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Purpose: This paper aims at making sense of how political parties have been generating and selecting emblems and symbols. The study seeks to clarify to what degree a political party’s strategic objectives and ideological believes may constitute the rationale for the choice of visual elements and how in the course of decades a change of policies, leaders or electoral fortunes as well as external dynamics and internal pressures could lead to a major revamp or minor adjustments of emblems that are at the core of a visual identity. The focus of this exploration is on Europe in the 20th and 21st century.

Relevance: The visual identity of organisations as expressed through the colour and design scheme of their respective logos have been widely discussed across academic disciplines. A debate which – quasi as a testimony to its significance – regularly attracts the attention of the professional community and witnesses practitioners weigh in on the subject. The prominent organisational role of emblems and theoretical underpinnings of their usage lend themselves as compelling backdrop that underlines the relevance of this study which extends our knowledge of symbolic language in the context of organisational logos in two directions by adding a historical dimension and by focussing our attention to the logo as an indispensable tool for communicators and publics in party politics. There is to the present day a dearth of research in marketing and public relations that empirically corroborates the core organisational function anecdotal findings and practitioner accounts in the course of political party history have been ascribing to emblems that serve a strategic communicative purpose in as much as they were instrumental in conveying the party’s political positioning and encapsulating members’ and supporters’ aspirations.

Methodology: For this historical study material has been drawn on from public libraries, archives, resources provided by thank tanks and political foundations, some of which are affiliated to political parties (e.g. Konrad Adenaur Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Dr. Karl Renner Institute, Politische Akademie der ÖVP).

Findings: It appears that political parties adopt, alter and exchange their logos in response to external political circumstances, alterations in ideological positioning, as a result of new marketing strategies and efforts to re-brand. Colour codes and design tend to be developed by external experts, while the ultimate organisational decision is usually taken by senior party management. The choice of signage is a reflection of the political content and the public image the party leadership aspires to adopt and convey. Apart from short and medium term factors that are often of a political nature, broader trends are noticeable that shape national
culture and fashion, which in turn mould public expectations and thus may dictate a complete revamp or minor alterations of emblems and visual features. Preferences and distinct iconic languages divide emblematic approaches from country to country, while some shared patterns are common to publics beyond national borders and therefore recognised across Europe. Increasing reliance on external professional advice – proffered by consultants with a corporate pedigree – begets design solutions that inadvertently lead to an alignment of symbolic codes one encounters in party politics and graphic ideas currently in vogue with developers of corporate visual identities. Across Europe, design trends for political party emblems can be detected: Ascendant political themes and core tenets of a party’s “Weltanschauung” – increasingly informed by the insights provided through opinion surveys – require to be translated into and expressed via symbolic language that portrays a commitment to sustainability, responsibility, ecological credential and inclusivity.

Implications: First, It appears that the respective logo does not – if all goes well – have an ongoing tangible impact on the political discourse, nor does it shape the attitudes and levels of support for a political party and its leader. However, the choice of a new emblem tends to lead to controversy and opposition internally, while the announcement of graphical changes do raise questions among political pundits and media correspondents that constitute a risk as well as an opportunity. On the one hand the new emblem’s meaning may be misconstrued or fail to convince, on the other, the public response affords the party with a limited opportunity to push some of its themes on the public agenda and make itself heard. Moreover, throughout the past decades logos have proven to be powerful communicative devices whose critical relevance is related to their contribution to breaking down complex political messages and ideological frameworks into a decipherable iconic code of signs and colours. Yet, it has been established that on many occasions the coding and decoding of political party symbols was far from straightforward and anything but predictable. Hence, the introduction of emblems is risky and one therefore is advised to keep the design, internal discussion and presentation of a new logo well out of campaign and election season.

The second implication is a prediction grounded in evolutionary patterns of party political emblems and is directed at party managers and communications practitioners: In the course of the century a tendency towards simplicity has become increasingly visible. Elaborated and sophisticated iconic language has found itself replaced by a no-nonsense, no-frills, straight-lines design.

A third observation is related to policy tendencies that since the 1980s have pushed notions of ecology and – more broadly – sustainability on the agenda. This shift in emphasis is reflected in the choice of emblems that were flexibly used – more explicitly so than in previous decades - to mirror political objectives and help steer exercises of ideological repositioning to prevail in party political competition.

At a practical level these three points entail implications that are most pertinent for a political party’s communications director to bear in mind as guidance and assistance for any communicative choices in support of strategy development.
From an academic perspective, the findings of this study may have implications for the disciplines of public relations and marketing as they ascertain the strategic rationale for logos in a party political context in the course of a century and thereby transcend the focus of recent research into the creation, purpose and management of logos in more current corporate environments.

**Originality:** A historical examination of the origins, purpose and usage of party political emblems and symbols in the 20th and 21st century has so far not been undertaken.
ABSTRACT


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This contribution primarily aims at answering the question whether content strategy is a new paradigm for PR or not. The literature review on selected PR-theories sheds light on the role of content in the context of strategies in previous times.

Cooper and Rockley (2012) hold that content strategy is “the creation, delivery, and governance of content”. Additionally, along with Cooper and Rockley (2012, p. 40) it should also be noted that content strategy refers to the creation of a content that can be efficiently “manufactured” into various information products. It is surprising that content strategy is consequently promoted as a new paradigm for public relations and corporate communication because of the fact that Radl and Wittenbrink (2015) emphasise that content strategy is an ongoing topic in both literature and practice since the 1990s, especially with a view to web and/or social media. Content strategy is a long-term management process for the dissemination of contents in the web and/or social media. Consequently, the process refers to the analysis, implementation and evaluation of contents. Although there are several studies, definitions and description concerning content strategy with regard to web and social media, little is known about the role of content strategy in previous times, even in times before web and social media. Looking at the definition elaborated by Cooper and Rockley (2012) it can be assumed that content strategy was part of considerations regarding PR, even without relations to web or social media. Following that, it is assumed that content strategy was discussed in PR-literature already previously.

Against this, the following contribution gives answers to questions such as; To what extent did authors reflect on content strategy with no regard to web and social media? What contexts framed the discussion? What types of strategies have been discussed and what types of recommendations have been given in the literature?

For the purpose of the research a literature review based on the approach elaborated by Cooper (2010) was considered. The purposive sample of approaches aims at demonstrating the role of content strategy in previous times. Against this, the analysis of the ‘Three Assumptions for Success’ elaborated by Mendelsohn (1973), the ‘Dynamic Theories’ elaborated by McGuire (1989), the ‘Integrated Communication Approach’ elaborated by Bruhn & Zimmermann (1993) and the ‘Theory for Strategic Planning’ published by Austin & Pinkleton (2001) gives insights into the role of content strategy in previous times.

The outline of the contribution follows a four-step-sequence; first, the theoretical considerations explain the terms content and strategy in order to develop a working definition
for the analysis. The second part presents the method followed by the main part highlighting the results. Last but not least, the concluding part indicates not only a summary, but rather provides some discussion points.

The research findings demonstrate that content strategy is not really a new paradigm. For instance, Mendelsohn (1973) recognised that campaigns often failed because messages were not tailor-made and were likely to be ignored or misinterpreted. Against this, Mendelsohn (1973) outlined three assumptions in order to plan tailor-made messages. Furthermore, compared to the theoretical frame it can be noted that there are similarities in terms of planning and coordination of messages, in terms of targeting publics and in terms of setting goals. Looking at this, it can be assumed that already in 1973 content strategy played a crucial role in the field of public relations. The analysis of the ‘Dynamic Theories’ elaborated by McGuire (1989) demonstrates also implications of content strategy. For example, McGuire (1989) elaborated a matrix that summarised hundreds of scientific studies on attitudes, persuasion and types of motivations that affect the response to public relations messages in a positive manner. Consequently, McGuire stated that a campaign might use both an emotive strategy to pique the public’s interest and a more logically based message to deepen the public’s understanding of the issue. The integrated corporate communication approach and the theory for strategic planning indicate again remarkable connections to content strategy. Summarised it can be noted that content strategy is not really a new paradigm, but rather promoted as new measure within public relations and corporate communication in the direction of web and social media.

This literature review demonstrates the role of content strategy in PR-approaches since the 1970s. In summary, the results point out that content strategy was a very important topic in previous times. In addition, the results highlight the contextual frames in which content strategy was discussed. Looking at this, misinterpretations, failed campaigns, positive effects of communication on the publics and the creation of a unified picture can be identified as important frames. In view of the recommendations the results illustrate that there are less differences between past and present. However, today’s recommendations refer to web and social media, to the new media. The old appears in new guise. Against this, it is obvious to question the development of PR-approaches critically, especially in view of real new development on the one hand, on the other it is of interest to what extent content strategy played a role even before the 1970s. In addition to literature reviews case studies should be considered to find answers.

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ABSTRACT

From Communication to Real Policy - The Management Game of a Great Communicator. The Case Study of Bruno Kreisky, the Media Chancellor in Austria from 1970 to 1983

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This contribution primarily aims at illustrating the PR- and communication instruments of the charismatic Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky and his government from 1970 to 1983. This case study was considered because of the inspired and suitable nickname of the famous chancellor. Bruno Kreisky (1911-1990) went into history as the media chancellor. Neither before nor after there was a chancellor in Austria, who was so able to work with the media.

According to Tenscher & Esser (2008) sociocultural, political and medial transformation processes stimulated manifold changes in the structures and contents of political PR and communication. Against this and in view of the political history in Austria, Bruno Kreisky is a particularly interesting example that illustrates a completely new political communication style in Austria against the background of the sociocultural, political and medial circumstances at that time. This case study reflects the noticeable communication strategies implemented by Bruno Kreisky. Although the period between 1970 and 1983 was characterised by international crises and conflicts such as oil crisis or unemployment, to name few examples, Kreisky succeeded in making a welfare state. With Spatzier (2015) it can be hold that Austrian’s population was satisfied during that period. In a more concrete vein, Urbas (1980) noted that in 1974/75 42 per cent of the population in Austria showed a very high confidence value in their government. In comparison, only 16 per cent of the population in the United States were very satisfied with the political actors during that time. However, looking at this it can be assumed that the result is due to political decisions on the one hand and related to the communication policy applied by Bruno Kreisky on the other.

This contribution gives answers to the question; What measures, instruments and strategies did Bruno Kreisky utilise to raise awareness, consciousness, international recognition in the media and political actors and satisfaction of the population? The results show that Bruno Kreisky is an extraordinary example for producing and deployment of issues, which, in turn, gave publics’ interests a voice. This kind of act is a specific element within Kreiskys communication strategy. However, Bruno Kreisky was not only an excellent rhetorician and used not only public speaking and events, but rather the journalistic environment, which he penetrated and won for himself. Furthermore the relationship with the population in Austria aimed at listening to the concerns of the people in order to bring practical political solutions. Additionally, along with Lendvai (1983) it can be noted that his dialog- and consensus-orientation in foreign policy is still exemplary today.
The following excerpts from the results of the literature and archival review show that the intention to convince people and the media was carried out by using four main instruments; *rhetorically glossy speeches* that attract attention and trustfulness; *dialog in the direction of consensus-orientation*; *personal relationships* with the population and understanding for journalistic means.

According to Nowotny (1976) it can be hold that Kreisky had a richly packed trick box in view of *talking and public speeches*. The focus was always on the excitement of attention, the overcoming of boredom and the taking of the audience. For such purpose he used on the one hand conscious swings of his voice on the other funny comparisons and coquettish understated phrases such as ‘I do not want to bother you’ or ‘I have no idea of cultural policy, however…’, in order to speak especially about this topic of expert judgment. Additionally, he addressed precisely the issues that touched the population. Scheidl (2010) noted that Bruno Kreisky was his own PR-agent, a very good one, who selected with Horvath (1989) the right topics for the social circumstances; freedom for all, freedom of thoughts, of words, of activism; equality of women and opportunities through education. Moreover, he focused on *dialog and consensus to fight for democracy and against terrorism*, especially illustrated through the correspondence with Willy Brandt and Olof Palme (Grass, Jäckel & Lattmann). Another example refers to the *relationship with the population*. Scheidl (2010) highlights the story about an old lady, who informed Kreisky during an election campaign about the injustice of expensive school trips. A few weeks later he remembered at the old lady and arranged a meeting with that woman in order to talk about the problems again, and shortly thereafter he implemented the free school transfer for children in Austria. Welan (1994) postulated that Kreisky created a *special government style through the combination of demoscropy and media politics* that captivated the population and the journalists. The fact that Bruno Kreisky was particularly *keen to play with the media* is due to the background that he regularly worked as journalist during his emigration (1938-1951) in Sweden even before the time of his political career in Austria (Kreisky 1996). Looking at this and in view of the relations with journalists it should be noted that he offered the journalists ready-made documents for the publication, which were probably also taken over. Horvath (1989) noted that for such purposes Kreisky established a special relationship of trust with selected journalists. His contacts to journalists extended all over the globe. Chief editors of ‘Le Monde’ or the ‘Figaro’ counted to his personal friends as well as of ‘L’Express’, to name some examples. Androsch (2015), the finance minister during the 1970’s, designated Kreisky as great communicator with a feeling for new development and issues. Against this it is not surprising that many important reforms have been implemented during his governmental period such as free education access for all, creation of jobs, equality of women, to name few examples. In summary, Kreisky succeeded in making a welfare state and his way of communication made a valuable contribution for that.

**References**


Abstract

History of Thai government PR: Lessons on power of social context in applying PR for peace process between Thailand and Cambodia

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The Thai–Cambodia dispute over the Preah Vihear temple (a 1,000-year-old temple, now UNESCO World Heritage, located at the borderline between Thailand and Cambodia) is one of the worst intra-ASEAN conflicts on record. In 1962, Cambodia filed unilateral application to International Court of Justice (ICJ) to claim the temple. ICJ finds that the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia. Thailand, however, says the ICJ ruling did not rule on the border, only on the temple itself. Cambodia again in 2011 asked ICJ to interpret the Judgment rendered in 1962. During 2011-2013 when court hearings taking place, there was a challenge for Thai government to balance national interests and relationship with Cambodia through various channels. Finally, on 11 November 2013, ICJ, again, declared that Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear and ordered Thailand to withdraw military or police forces from the temple (www.theguardian.com). There was no violence both within Thailand and at the borderline. It is believed that this is a result of the power of government PR that increases public support (Lee, Neeley, & Stewart, 2012).

This research aims to 1) analyze the status of information operations through public relations, advertising and mass media of Thai government and to assess perceptions of stakeholders on the impacts of news disseminations particularly on Thai-Cambodia relations and 2) to integrate a body of knowledge on public relations, advertising and mass communication on international information operations. Methodology employed was mainly mix-method qualitative techniques, including content analysis, depth-interview and brainstorming.

Findings are as follows:

(1) News dissemination on Thai-Cambodia relationship of Thai security agencies through mass media can be divided into 3 phases: The first phase: The communication process was mainly passive. A lack of co-operation and information management led to dispersed news dissemination. The second phase: The government agencies recognized the communication problem and set up a team of spokespersons from related security agencies to prepare information about the Preah Vihear temple case for public. The third phase: Thai government worked actively by strategically contact important target groups such as
securities agencies, media, political groups, both in the parliament and outside, and public, to inform them correct and timely information.

(2) Thai media highly regarded the Preah Vihear temple case as an important issue as its consequences could affect internal politics, economy and international relations, both at national and regional level. The point of view from which media would present news was rested upon the policy of media’s owners. Mainstream media only focused on Preah Vihear when people showed interest in this topic. Government’s media, however, focused on fact to create knowledge and avoid news that could instigate anger and conflict. News agenda selected by media usually depended on important incidents in each period. The verdict of International Court of Justice was the news highlight.

Foreign media in Thailand paid less attention to the case and focused on daily incident, while Asian media also did not give importance to this issue.

(3) Main patterns of news reporting were daily news report. News anchors sought information by themselves. Leaders were presented most in the news, followed by military.

(4) News reporting on Preah Vihear dispute reflected the communication problems from the government, namely, delayed public relations process and a narrow focus only on the legal dispute, particularly on borderline. Other point of views, for example, resolution of the problem, local’s interest, cultural and economic aspects have been set aside. Media has also been challenged to balance the “freedom of information” and its “consequences”. By focusing on dispute and verdict from IJC and ignoring other social aspects, resulted in superficial news reporting.

Impacts from Preah Vihear dispute news reporting are significant to many groups such as business group, Cambodians working in Thailand, local authority, Thai people and tourism sectors.

(5) Communication guidelines and recommendations are 1) seeking mutual resolution and mutual benefits from the dispute area 2) inviting decision makers from both sides to negotiate 3) seeking credible decision makers who uphold national interest to communicate 4) Utilizing government relations activities 5) seeking co-operation from media 6) using public information principle to disseminate information 7) using issues/crisis communication principle 8) communicating through both private-public diplomacy 9) using cultural relations activities to manage relationship in the long term.

References

ABSTRACT

“Good Trouble” in Sin City
A History of Protest and Social Activism in Las Vegas

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American Congressman and legendary civil rights activist John Lewis has been arrested for demonstrating for justice and equality over 50 times. He refers to these arrests as “good trouble” – the kind of actions one takes that, while they may seem illegal on their face, serve to promote a greater good for society. Inspired by Lewis, the social media hashtag #goodtrouble has become popular in discussions about social justice in the U.S. and abroad.

This presentation will explore the history of activism (and more specifically, public protest) in the city of Las Vegas, primarily in the areas of civil rights, welfare rights, and workers’ rights. Many of the protest movements in Las Vegas have flown under the radar. While much is known about Rosa Parks’ actions on a Birmingham bus and the march across the Edmund Pettiss Bridge in Selma, little is known about the welfare mothers’ march that shut down the Las Vegas Strip and wound through Caesars Palace casino in an attempt to draw attention to the suffering of families living in poverty (Orleck, 2005).

Straughan (2004) has noted that during the U.S. civil rights movement of the mid-20th century, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) employed traditional public relations tactics such as providing accurate information, producing annual reports and reports on special topics, and engaging the media through the use of press releases. However, it was a 1960 sit-in at a Woolworth’s lunch counter in Greensboro, NC that really focused public attention on the fight for civil rights. While digital social advocacy, as described by Hon (2015), holds potential to fight for justice on a new frontier, the coverage of in-person events such as Black Lives Matter demonstrations and the Women’s March on Washington shows the continued relevance of in-person protest even in a digital world.

At a time of renewed interest and participation in public protest, this historical look at activism in Las Vegas provides a springboard for us to consider the role of public protest as a communication tool for social movements. The history of Las Vegas shows that protest itself, as well as the threat of public action, moves the needle considerably only when it is disruptive and inconvenient. The welfare mothers and civil rights activists of Las Vegas – a city once dubbed “the Mississippi of the West” for its racism and segregation – have a great deal to teach us about the communicative power of protest. It is imperative that we listen and learn.
References


ABSTRACT

Bernays’ Last Stand: An investigation of the attempt to “professionalize” the public relations field in the United States through licensure

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Edward Bernays, considered by many to be the father of modern public relations practice in the United States, spent considerable time writing on the necessity of licensure in public relations; in part, because he believed it would lead to the longevity of the profession (Bernays, 1986).

This study focuses on the Bernays’ efforts to legitimize public relations as a profession in the United States throughout his career, with a particular emphasis on his later years, when he would increasingly advocate for licensure. Relying primarily on Bernays’ writing, the methodology also includes interviews with his contemporaries who were witness to his attempts.

Starting in 1923 Bernays began to focus on the need for professionalization of the field. In his book The Later Years: Public Relations Insights 1956-86, he stated public relations “has the earmarks of a profession […] it lacks only state registration and licensing, a characteristic of other professions ”(Bernays, 1986, p.93), thus illustrating early on, his belief that the field’s practitioners needed licensing in order to be perceived as legitimate, on par with other professional fields such as medicine, law and clergy.

This continued throughout much of his career, particularly in his later years as his day-to-day duties diminished, Bernays acted as more a standard bearer for the profession. He turned his skillful abilities in working on behalf of his clients toward advocating for the profession as a whole. To this end, he attempted to create the Public Relations Practitioners for Licensing and Registration (PRPLR) for public relations practitioners (Bernays, 1986). The PRPLR was a group of likeminded practitioners who Bernays assembled with the intent of spearheading licensing from within the field (Bernays, 1986).

Bernays sought, to a large extent, the involvement of government in the licensing of public relations practitioners. He attempted to pass legislation on the state level, believing incremental change might lead to an overhaul of the profession. While abortive, in 1991, Bernays helped bring legislation in Massachusetts that would have instituted licensing on the state level. Ultimately, Bernays’ attempts to license the public relations profession in the United States would fail for a variety of reasons, and this paper concludes by understanding the ideology and ethics of licensing, and seeks to answer why licensing was never able to take hold in the United States, but also why in other countries licensing has been achieved. It
further explores contemporary issues with licensing and ancillary concerns, such as recent attempts in the state of New York to require registration of public relations practitioners who work with public campaigns.

By examining Bernays’, and his contemporaries, attempts to institute licensing, this paper seeks to give an overview of the historic efforts for licensing, led by Bernays, and the impact it had, and continues to have, on the field of public relations.

References


ABSTRACT

Eight Decades of the Government Public Relations Department of Thailand: the Never Changing Story?

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The paper focuses on the roles and works of Government Public Relations Department (GPRD) of Thailand in promoting and propagating the government’s messages, activities and policies, since the beginning period of modern Thai PR until the present. The establishment of GPRD, modelled by the establishment of German government’s Press Department, is generally remarked as the starting point of modern Thai Public Relations period. The GPRD’s roles and works are elaborated in three periods according to modern Thai PR history (Tantivejakul; 2014): the Beginning period (1933-1956), the Growth period (1957-1982), and the Golden period (1983 – the present).

The Government Public Relations Department (GPRD) was established in 1933 by the Siamese Government after the country went through the Siamese revolution in 1932 which turned Siam’s governing system from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional one. In 1932, the word “democracy” itself was rarely heard amongst the Siamese, therefore, the government claimed that the main role of GPRD was to promote and educate ideas about democracy to the people. Under years of military leadership – especially Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkram- GPRD promoted nationalism and Thai identity through cultural campaigns during pre-and World War II. It was during this time the name of the country was changed from Siam to Thailand. The GPRD’s information was dominantly about the notion of democracy and government policies regardless of the Monarchy. The information was distributed through government’s radio channels, newspapers, publications, stage events, public communication mobile units and press conferences with tight government’s control and censorship. However, the communication network of GPRD was limited to some specific areas due to the underdeveloped national infrastructures.

During the Growth period, GPRD - most of the time - continued its works under military governments. The infrastructures and GPRD’s communication media were nationwide developed to cover the country’s strategic areas in response to the National Economic and Social Development Plans and the threat of Communism in South East Asia. The government’s communication focused on establishing the knowledge of government policies and activities regarding public health, agricultural and industrial developments, with the promoted messages concerning Thai people’s living conditions. To educate Thai people in rural areas is one of the main purposes of GPRD’s works. The influence of the United States was strongly sensed in terms of military and economic supports as the communists gained more power in neighboring countries like Vietnam and Laos. The GPRD communication media network was expanded widely all through the country toward the end of this period in order to widely disseminate important government’s information and to
announce the government’s initiatives to the public. During this time, the royal rites and traditional rituals were restored.

The third period of Thai PR history could be divided into two sub-periods. The former was around 1983-2000 and the latter was after 2000 – when globalization became prominent in Thailand - until the present. In the former one, the GPRD’s work and network was completely expanded to every province in Thailand. GPRD performed an important role in developing the National Public Relations Plan and Policies in order to unite the implementations and work forces of other governmental PR units. However, the attempts were seemingly unsuccessful due to its bureaucratic culture, the political instability and interference from both military and civilian governments. In 2000, GPRD was going through the reformation process due to the public’s voices about its lack in rapid changes of globalization and the coming digital technology, but assumedly failed to perform its role. Even though GPRD owned a vast number of media channels, it was criticized for not making active and effective uses as well as for its one-way information dissemination role to the public. During the political turmoil in the last decade (Red-Yellow Shirts), GPRD continued its work without a guideline of any national public relations plans. GPRD message was less credited by the public as the political interference was strongly observed and one-sided message was promoted to support the political party which governed the country. While the changing media landscape provides the public so-called new media channels and social network to reach for information in real-time basis, the GPRD’s roles and works in hands of various governments seems not to have much progress from the beginning of its establishment. The new National Public Relations Plan and Policies was just announced in 2015 after 10 years of having none.

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ABSTRACT

The 1952 Memorandum on Government Publicity

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Aim and Introduction

This paper describes a written protest by Members of Parliament (MP) of the UK Conservative Party about the regressive public relations approach of Winston Churchill when he returned to 10 Downing Street on 25 October 1951 as Prime Minister aged 77 after a general election.

Churchill saw no need for the infrastructure of public relations assembled by the Labour Government of Clement Attlee. He felt journalists should find out information for themselves and insisted the “Public Relations Officers and the Central Office of Information set up by the Socialist government must be abolished” (FICA, 1973). Churchill replaced the technocratic institutions and processes of the Labour government with a return to his wartime approach of making speeches to Parliament and broadcasting direct to the people. The approach was not effective and led to representations by members of the 1922 Committee of backbench MPs who aired their concerns in a Memorandum on Government Publicity that was submitted to the Prime Minister in April 1952.

Methodology

The project is based on original research in The Conservative Party Archive at The Bodleian Library, University of Oxford and the Churchill Archives Centre at Churchill College, University of Cambridge. The main line of inquiry was examination of primary sources, including correspondence between the Prime Minister, his staff, government ministers and Conservative members of Parliament, along with the Memorandum itself which was discovered in the personal papers of Lord Swinton. The minute book of the Conservative Party’s 1922 Committee, whose proceedings are private, was also reviewed (by kind permission of the current chairman of the 1922 Committee) in order to gather the temporal detail and sequential development of MPs’ concern about government public relations into a formal memorandum.

Findings

Seven years after the end of World War II, the Memorandum shows how wartime experience continued to frame government public relations for some politicians: “The British people in peace, like the British soldier in war, like to be in the picture” (1922 Committee, 1952, p. 1).

The 1922 Committee distinguishes between the political public relations and policy promotion of Conservative Central Office and communication by Ministers “whose
statements can be the most valuable publicity of all” (1922 Committee, 1952, p. 1). There is a partisan approach in the text, which lists five examples of badly-handled government publicity from which the Opposition’s “Socialist propagandists have profited” (1922 Committee, 1952, p. 1). Despite this tone, there is also admiration for the professional public relations approach adopted by the Labour Party when it was in office:

While the performance of the Socialist Government was lamentable, its publicity was effective and it had good liaison even with the sections of the press hostile to its policies. There was a Ministerial Committee which was responsible for putting the Government’s case and high level liaison with the press was maintained (1922 Committee, 1952, p. 2)

Implications

The Memorandum concludes with some proposals that were surprisingly political and which if implemented would have breached the impartial traditions of the British Civil Service, suggesting that the outcome of non-political public relations officers for each Ministry – and even at Downing Street for many years – was not secure by 1953. In proposing an official press officer for the Government, for example, the Memorandum notes that the new recruit must be “an anti-Socialist or non-Socialist” and that “the appointment of any senior public relations officers in the various Ministries who were chosen by the late Government for their Socialist views should terminated” (1922 Committee, p. 2).

Along with the related exchanges between the different actors, the Memorandum on Government Publicity of 1952 provides a valuable historical insight into the way politicians in the immediate post-war period thought about the process of governmental public relations. The practical and historical implications were that the Memorandum led to the establishment of a Ministerial Committee for government publicity chaired by Lord Swinton and the appointment of a public relations adviser to the Prime Minister, Sir Thomas Fife Clark. Fife Clark became a trusted adviser to Churchill who eventually bought him into 10 Downing Street, where he served until the Prime Minister stood down in 1955. Although the new approach to government publicity meant that the Central Office of Information survived, it came too late for its Crown Film Unit which Churchill had already disbanded by 1952.

Originality

While the episode of the 1922 Committee’s Memorandum on Government Publicity and its consequences has been mentioned in passing in some political histories and biographies of the period, it has not been addressed in public relations historiography, nor has its text been published. The material presented here also offers an original counter-narrative to the historical myth of Churchill as a master communicator. Despite having been a journalist and his strong personal relationships with newspaper proprietors, the project establishes that in this post-war period at least, Churchill paid little attention to the press in considering the communication aspects of government business. The result was an often chaotic presentation of government policy, which even led to Churchill himself becoming frustrated by his own Government’s news management when on one occasion, according to Cross (1982, p. 270),
fourteen White Papers were issued on the same day, and, on another, the Ministry of Food announced the ending of cheese rationing without notifying him (or apparently anyone else) in advance”.

References


ABSTRACT

Promoting peace and global governance: The United Nations and The Blue Vanguard

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Purpose

The project investigates the use of documentary film as a public relations tool by the United Nations (UN) to promote its first peacekeeping intervention. In October 1956, the UN General Assembly deployed the first multinational UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to Egypt with the consent of the Egyptian Government during the Suez Crisis, which had arisen following the invasion of Egypt by British, French and Israeli forces in October and November 1956 with the aim of controlling the Suez Canal and toppling Colonel Nasser, the Egyptian President.

Suez was a transitional moment, as the nationalistic war machinery associated with World War II was replaced by a multi-country force operating with a UN mandate to keep the warring parties apart and ensure an orderly withdrawal of aggressors. The main object of investigation is the 1957 documentary film, The Blue Vanguard, made by the UN Department of Public Information to capture this transitional moment in a filmic format, enable global projection of the institution and provide a visual record of the UN’s success in enforcing peace and governance in the post-war era that could be distributed in cinemas and through television.

Methodology

The historical investigation focussed first on the institutions, agents and intended messages that led to the film being commissioned using the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Bannerman & Haggart, 2015). The second aspect was an authorship inquiry based on based on auteur theory, into how and why the film was made from the perspective of the producer and his personal vision for the output and the resulting “form, style and meanings,” (Thompson & Bordwell, 1994, p. 492). The authorship investigation was based on scrutiny of primary historical documents relating to the making of The Blue Vanguard in the personal papers of the director, Thorold Dickinson, which contain a comprehensive set of production files. Finally, the author viewed a copy of The Blue Vanguard and sought to identify and analyse what Quintana and Xifra (2016, p. 288) have called the “propaganda and public relations discourse” within the film itself.

Findings

The Blue Vanguard was one of the first documentaries commissioned by the UN and since the institution’s film-making infrastructure was limited, it was made by the National
Film Board of Canada for the UN Department of Public Information with the UN’s newly appointed Chief of Film Services, Thorold Dickinson, as “UN production liaison” and editor. The film skilfully mixes diplomatic activity at the UN General Assembly in New York, operational planning and troop deployment in multiple locations, newsreel footage of events and sequences of action on the ground in Egypt. Together, these elements form a purposeful visual propagation of how the UN is engaging in a new type of military activity in order to bring peace and provide a new type of global governance based on transnational cooperation. The novelty of this global and supra-national outlook is explicit in the voiceover opening the film:

A new kind of Army with a new kind of job. To keep the peace through a buffer zone. An international force. (The Blue Vanguard, 1957)

Varied voices and visual registers are used to convey both the multi-national and multi-cultural nature of the UNEF and also a message of the reality and danger of the UN peacekeeping work on the ground and its effectiveness in enforcing what seems like an “artificial line” drawn on a map to form a buffer zone. We also see the campaign through the eyes (and hear the voices of) Norwegian and Canadian soldiers, as well as seeing the troops from different nations sharing their cultures over Christmas and during downtime, with Columbians decorating a Christmas tree, Indian pipers providing music and Indonesian dancers some entertainment. Despite their small numbers, the Yugoslav contingent feature prominently as they were the only communist country to send forces and this involvement was a message the UN wished to emphasise. Over stirring music and aerial footage of the buffer zone area, the film concludes in a voiceover:

The orders were carried out. This was the result. The defence line. A frontier where men must be diplomats as well as soldiers. The men of the United Nations Emergency Force are in the middle. To this frontier, these men brought peace. (The Blue Vanguard, 1957)

Implications and Limitations

Against the temporal background of a World War that had ended just 10 years previously, The Blue Vanguard is a fascinating early attempt to use documentary to promote the work of an institution of global governance that relied on transnational support to a worldwide audience. The problems the UN producers encountered with objections to the commentary and voiceover (but not the visuals) from the combatant nations led to Dickinson rethinking his approach to using visuality as the basis for communicating promotional messages of peace in his next UN documentary film, Overture, which had main titles in five languages but not a word spoken, in order to appeal as widely as possible to a multinational audience independent of language.

More specifically, the project raises wider questions about the nature of global public relations and public information programmes associated with peace and international peacekeeping. Interestingly – and separate from the UN Department of Public Information - the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) had already
initiated several projects on these themes in the early 1950s, which included exhibitions and
the sponsorship of an International Society for Education through Art, which promoted some
of the ideas of Herbert Read and his 1949 book *Education for Peace*.

**References**


Croatia in its present form has not been united until the creation of second Yugoslavia established after the WWII. However, the activities towards unifying the so-called Croatian lands have occurred in 19th century with a delayed modernisation process that spread to Croatian territories from other European countries also going through the process of modernisation and national unifications. The Croatian lands were present Croatian regions, namely Dalmatia, Slavonia, Rijeka and surrounding areas, Istria and present Lika (at the time renamed to Vojna Krajina due to military nature of the region, i.e. Vojna Krajina in translation would mean Military Quarter). One of the reasons why Croatian modernisation was late can be found in the complexity of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy where the Duchies of Croatia and the Kingdom of Slavonia were under Hungarian rule while Dalmatia, Rijeka and surrounding areas and Istria were under the Austrian rule. The Vojna Krajina region was under the direct rule of Vienna due to its military importance.

Historians argue that the Croatian People’s Movement originally started in 1790, which presents a beginning phase of the Movement (Stančić 1981; 2002; 2007; Šidak 1980-81); however, the activities and formalisation of the Movement reached its peak during the 19th century. The Movement worked towards unification of Dalmatia with Croatia advocating introduction of Croatian language to the education system and public administration. The main opponent to their work was the Autonomous movement of Dalmatian Italians who saw introduction of Croatian language as a threat to otherwise Italianised Dalmatian culture (Peričić, 2003). The Autonomous movement therefore advocated that Dalmatia has an Italian culture and that Italian language is more natural to Dalmatians than Croatian. In addition, they were also discussing personal appearance arguing that Dalmatians and Croats simply do not belong to the same race, in which they demonstrated certain racism by arguing that Dalmatians are superior to Croats. The main proponent of the Croatian People’s Movement in Dalmatia was a Catholic priest Mihovil Pavlinović who set the foundation for the ultimate victory of Croatian People’s Movement in Dalmatia by going to the people, talking to them to persuade them to embrace Croatian identity and language, as well as by extensively publishing his travel diaries documenting his advocacy work and teaching people Croatian language.

In this paper, I will analyze Pavlinović’s work, namely his publications in which he reported what he talked about with people and how he approached them. This publishing period is in historian work known as “the war of brochures”. The argument of the paper is that Pavlinović is one of the precursors of Croatian Public Relations who used the
combination of PR tactic of building relations with society in order to achieve goals, as well as persuasive communication. While available data on Croatian PR states that Croatian institutionalised PR emerged in 1964, in this paper I am arguing that the PR in a non-institutionalized form started at least in the 19th century. In my argument, I am using socio-cultural approach arguing that the ultimate success of the Croatian People’s Movement was due to foundations set by Pavlinović due to his outstanding PR work and that Pavlinović’s work can be analysed within modern PR theory due to the fact he was going to the society to not only persuade people to identify as Croats but also to listen to their concerns and act upon it, as well as through his activist work in teaching people the Croatian language.

The method of the paper is a narrative analysis of brochures taking social and cultural context into consideration, and understanding stories told by Pavlinović as his own experience that then contributed towards the wider movement and the political agenda. The limitation of the method is that we do not know whether absolutely every conversation he reported on actually happened or if there are elements of propaganda in his work. However, while Croatian historians acknowledge this limitation too, they also verified Pavlinović’s work and truthfulness of what he reported (e.g. going to people and talking to them, teaching them language, etc.). The paper contributes towards history of PR in Croatia and Central Europe, which is an unexplored area of research, and as such the paper presents a potential for encouraging further debates and research.

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ABSTRACT

The promotion of saintly cults in the medieval era

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The cults of saints are first recorded in the later Roman era and continued to expand throughout the medieval era across Europe in both Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christian traditions. Their aim was to create awareness of the saint and attract worshippers to tombs, reliquaries and monasteries or convents where the saint had lived. The concept of ‘saint’ is not limited to Christianity but is most prevalent in that religion.

There appear to be four stages in the formation and development of cults. Initial diffusion of saintly relics helped create relationships between the saint and the individual, encouraging cult growth through miraculous occurrences, typically recovery from illness or disability, and attendance at the saint’s tomb or reliquary. Secondly, monastic communities wrote and hagiographies (promotional biographies) to spread awareness and recognition of saints. These stories idealised the saints and their images, while helping promote the monastery. Thirdly, the church sought lay interaction with the saint through enshrinement, allowing for miraculous instances to occur. Pilgrimages to shrines were encouraged as both a response to awareness of cults and to further promote them among peers. This travel, often at considerable personal expense and danger empowered the church’s overall reputation. Finally, support by monarchs and senior aristocracy increased church authority and stimulated cult building. All stages needed methods of communication, promotion and persuasion for the cults to launch and then develop into sustainable entities.

Within public relations historical scholarship there has been limited research into early promotional activities that created awareness of saints, their reliquaries and good works. Watson (2008) investigated the cult of Saint Swithun which was established in late tenth century England and developed into the second-most popular cult, after that of the martyred St Thomas Beckett and until the dissolution of the monasteries in the 1530. Spaulding and Dodd (2014) reported on the cult of Saint Hildegard von Bingen, a twelfth century German saint, whilst Brown (2003, 2014), Carty (2007, 2014), Lamme (2015) and Tilson (2002, 2011, 2014) have researched the nexus between religion and public relations, ancient and modern.

Watson (2008) demonstrated the broad use of strategic and tactical public relations-like activity (liturgy, hagiography, events), which he called ‘proto public relations’, in the promotion of one saintly cult. In this paper, further research will consider how other major cults, for example of St Francis of Assisi in 13th century Italy, were formed and promoted, as well as lesser known cults in England and other European countries.

The research will mostly be based on secondary sources from medieval history literature supplemented with translated materials from charters, liturgical documents and
other contemporary records. It will consider, in particular, the role of hagiography in finessing the history of saints either as a key element in promoting the person for canonisation or in promoting the cult after their translation to sainthood.

The paper will widen the base of understanding of public relations’ antecedent activities among the clergy, the most highly educated group of the medieval era, and thus contribute to knowledge of proto public relations.

References


ABSTRACT

How PR Created a Country: Mythos, Propaganda and the Balfour Declaration of 1917

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Towards the end of the nineteenth century several European nations occupied by foreign powers began the long, hard march to independence. Most notably were the Irish, Italians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Poles and Czechs. Long dominated by the ‘Great Powers,’ the empires of Great Britain, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary and the Ottomans, these peoples fought politically and occasionally militarily for their land and for freedom. Ironically, their greatest opportunity came with the destruction wrought by the ‘Great War for Civilisation’ of 1914-1918 which brought down all but one of these empires. It was if a mighty hand had come down and thrown all the political cards of Europe up into the air. When the cards fell again at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 the political landscape of Europe would be completely reshaped.

Meanwhile another ‘nation’ was feeling the first stirrings of ‘auto-emancipation.’ The Jews having endured over 1,800 years of exile and persecution were still largely settled in these same European territories: Russia, Poland, Germany, Rumania, Austro-Hungary and the near East. Following the infamous Dreyfus Affair of 1894 in France and the publication of “Der Judenstaat” (A State for the Jews) by the young Viennese journalist Theodore Herzl, the world Zionist movement was launched in Basel in 1897. Its impossible dream: to return the bulk of world Jewry to their ancient biblical, Mediterranean homeland: Israel.

Miraculously several political and diplomatic necessities would coincide during the Great War that would help to turn Herzl’s dream into a distinct political reality. His propaganda and that of the scientist and lobbyist supreme Dr Chaim Weizmann would convince His Majesty’s wartime coalition government, headed by David Lloyd George and Arthur Balfour, to support the Zionist platform and issue the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that promised, “to establish a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine.” Rarely had such an audacious statement of government policy been made in one of the great chancelleries of Europe. For Palestine was still enemy territory only recently conquered and occupied by Britain. The war was not over. What led the British to give such unequivocal backing to a political movement with little funding; few full-time staff and nothing other than a brilliant public relations campaign staffed by some of the brightest and best journalists and writers in Europe?

This lecture provides insights into the methodology of the relentless PR and lobbying campaigns conducted by the Zionists during and immediately after the Great War. It explains how the myth of ‘Jewish power,’ the need for American involvement in the Allied cause, the acute shortage of munitions by 1917 and the non-conformist, Christian childhoods of proto-
Zionists like social reformer 7th Earl of Shaftesbury, novelist George Elliott, David Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, Woodrow Wilson and other Allied leaders all coincided to produce the Declaration. A statement that would not only reverberate throughout the politics of the 20th century but would lead directly to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and to the shaping of the modern Middle East.

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ABSTRACT

The Important and Significant Role Played by the Institute for Public Relations in the Growth and Development of Communication Research, Measurement and Evaluation

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When the Institute for Public Relations (IPR) was created as the Foundation for Public Relations Research & Education (FPRRE) in 1955 the practice of public relations was considerably different from how the industry functions today.

In earlier years, public relations focused mainly on technical tasks and helping organizations answer questions such as “what should we say,” and “how should we say it.” While those activities remain an important part of public relations, the industry has grown in importance to the point where most successful companies follow public relations advice when deciding “what to do,” and “how to do it.”

As Stacks (2011) points out, “As the practice of public relations has grown over the years, so too has the use of research.” (p. 15) Wright (1998) stresses the need for and importance of research as public relations moves from a fairly simplified technician-based one-way practice into two-way communication activities at management and executive levels. This is the point where those who practice public relations are concerned not only with message distribution but also that these messages reach the intended target audiences and diffuse through them leading to attitude, opinion and behavior change.

This paper traces the role IPR has played facilitating the growth and development of research, measurement and evaluation in public relations during the past 60 years. It focuses on a number of activities including

- Establishing the “IPR Annual Lecture” fund-raising event in 1961.
- Creating and publishing Public Relations Review, the world’s first blind-reviewed scholarly journal for public relations scholarship in 1975.
- Initiating the annual “Best Master’s Thesis Award” competition in 1980.
- Funding the Pathfinder Award for individual accomplishment in public relations research in 1984.

Hosting what is believed to have been the world’s first “Summit on Public Relations Measurement and Evaluation” in 1996.

Establishing the IPR Commission on Research Measurement and Evaluation in 1996.


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ABSTRACT

Opening the box: A ‘pastpresents’ exploration of the archival fonds of a singular PR practitioner

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This paper contributes towards the limited examination of archival research in the field of public relations history. It extends consideration of what constitutes an archive away from formal collections (Watson 2014) into the personal fond of an individual practitioner.

As a response to Watson’s (2016) call to become involved in archival preparation in “training as a historian and as a researcher”, the opportunity outlined in this paper occurred by chance.

Delivery of a standard sized (285 x 333 x 290 mm) cardboard archive box of public relations materials (books, pamphlets and magazines) dating from the 1970s and 1980s presented itself as “the whole of the records” (Meehan 2014 p.69) of a singular PR practitioner.

As such, opening the box becomes the starting point in a research methodology to explore an entity that reflects archival fonds, being “organically created and/or accumulated and used by a particular person … in the course of that creator’s activities and functions” (International Council on Archives 1995 p.6).

The box itself comprises “archives of a single origin” (Duchein 1983, p.65) providing the “trace” (Moore et al. 2017 p.ix) of the practice of public relations at a particular time during which its contents were accumulated. Further it represents an archival artefact as created to be passed on to the recipient as an historical researcher.

This paper, therefore, records and analyses the content of the box as a set of materials representing the archival fonds of the creator. It also seeks to assess and enhance the “documentary content with contextual information and linkage to other records” (McCrank 2001 p.251) of the historical understanding of public relations.

Beyond a focus on the materials themselves, the paper provides an example of pastpresents in “how the past and the present continually converge, collapse and co-invent each other” (King 2010). An oral history interview with the creator – the singular PR practitioner – reviews the materials within the box and the author’s historical analysis to combine the “knowledge and skills of both parties” (Abrams 2010 p.13). The resultant contemporary narrative comprising “fragments of memories, feelings, events and ideas” (Sermijn et al. 2008 p.634) is added as an original contribution to the box.
Consequently, the paper seeks to connect methodical and systematic historical research to the "nature of the *fonds*, which is a living creation" (Duchein 1983 p.81). Doing so evidences the notion of “creatorship”, which Cook (1993) views as “central to the concept of the *fonds*”.

**References:**


Duchein, M. 1983. Theoretical principles and practical problems of respect des *fonds* in Archival Science. *Archivaria* 16 (Summer), 64-82.


